| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Felan Framework plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'process_plugin_actions' function called via an AJAX action in versions up to, and including, 1.1.4. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to activate or deactivate arbitrary plugins. |
| The Felan Framework plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to improper authentication in versions up to, and including, 1.1.4. This is due to the hardcoded password in the 'fb_ajax_login_or_register' function and in the 'google_ajax_login_or_register' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing user on the site, if they registered with facebook or google social login and did not change their password. |
| STOMP over WebSocket applications may be vulnerable to a security bypass that allows an attacker to send unauthorized messages.
Affected Spring Products and VersionsSpring Framework:
* 6.2.0 - 6.2.11
* 6.1.0 - 6.1.23
* 6.0.x - 6.0.29
* 5.3.0 - 5.3.45
* Older, unsupported versions are also affected.
MitigationUsers of affected versions should upgrade to the corresponding fixed version.
Affected version(s)Fix versionAvailability6.2.x6.2.12OSS6.1.x6.1.24 Commercial https://enterprise.spring.io/ 6.0.xN/A Out of support https://spring.io/projects/spring-framework#support 5.3.x5.3.46 Commercial https://enterprise.spring.io/ No further mitigation steps are necessary.
CreditThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly reported by Jannis Kaiser. |
| A vulnerability was identified in thinkgem JeeSite up to 5.12.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file modules/core/src/main/java/com/jeesite/common/ueditor/ActionEnter.java of the component UEditor Image Grabber. Such manipulation of the argument Source leads to server-side request forgery. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the patch is 1c5e49b0818037452148e0f8ff69ed04cb8fefdc. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in Mangati NovoSGA up to 2.2.9. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /admin of the component SVG File Handler. Performing manipulation of the argument logoNavbar/logoLogin results in cross site scripting. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. |
| A vulnerability was identified in Portabilis i-Educar up to 2.10. Impacted is an unknown function of the file /intranet/educar_calendario_anotacao_cad.php. Such manipulation of the argument nm_anotacao/descricao leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Portabilis i-Educar up to 2.10. The affected element is an unknown function of the file /intranet/educar_turma_tipo_cad.php. Such manipulation of the argument nm_tipo leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. |
| It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again.
Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset.
The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels.
If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8.
If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8.
The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data.
We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
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