| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| S2OPC 1.7.3 contains an out-of-bounds read in RepublishResponse handling. This allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service |
| The H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_byte, H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_nooptype, and H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_atomic functions in H5Znbit.c in HDF5 through 2.3.0 advance a read index into the compressed chunk buffer without bounding it against the buffer's actual size. This allows attackers to cause an out-of-bounds heap read, and in constrained cases disclosure of adjacent heap memory into decompressed dataset values, via a crafted HDF5 file whose N-Bit filter parameters describe more decompressed data than the stored compressed chunk actually contains, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5repack tools. |
| H5Z__filter_fletcher32 in H5Zfletcher32.c in HDF5 through 2.3.0 computes the data length to checksum by subtracting the 4-byte trailing checksum size from the input buffer size without checking that the buffer is at least 4 bytes, allowing a size_t underflow. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (massively out-of-bounds read and application crash in H5_checksum_fletcher32) via a crafted HDF5 file with a Fletcher32-filtered chunk smaller than 4 bytes, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5dump tools. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in open62541 v1.5.5 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the Service_Call validates input arguments against runtime-resolved InputArguments metadata |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, offscreen rendering frame data received from the GPU process was not fully validated by the main process. A compromised GPU process could cause the main process to read out-of-bounds memory while producing paint event images, disclosing memory or crashing the app. This issue is fixed in 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| A flaw was found in the file-icns plugin in GIMP. When applying a decompressed mask during ICNS image processing, the plugin reads from the mask data buffer without verifying if the cursor exceeds the allocated resource size. If a crafted file contains a truncated mask resource, the icns_decompress function continues reading past the bounds of the buffer. This out-of-bounds read vulnerability results in information disclosure of heap contents, where memory contents are leaked as alpha channel pixel values, or a crash leading to a denial of service if unmapped memory is accessed. |
| open62541 1.5.5 contains an out-of-bounds read in the client-side function responseReadNamespacesArray() in src/client/ua_client_connect.c. |
| nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds stack read leading to a wild-pointer write in nmbs_read_device_identification_basic() / recv_read_device_identification_res() in nanomodbus.c. A fixed 3-element stack array order[3] = {0,1,2} maps object IDs to buffer indices. The server-supplied object_id field (0-255, read directly from the wire) is used without any bounds check as buf_index = order[object_id]. When a malicious Modbus server sends a Read Device Identification response with object_id >= 3, this reads an out-of-bounds/garbage byte from the stack adjacent to order[], which is then used as an index into a 3-element buffers[] array of char* pointers. The resulting wild pointer is passed to strncpy() as the destination, causing an arbitrary-address write with server-controlled data. |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the find_line_delimiter() function in the multipart body parser performs an out-of-bounds read via strncmp() when searching for MIME boundary delimiters. After finding a -- pattern near the end of the body, the function compares delimiter.len bytes (typically 20-70) starting from a position at or past the logical end of the body buffer, reading past the body boundary. The bug triggers when a SIP message has Content-Type: multipart/mixed with a boundary parameter and its body contains -- within two to three bytes of the body's end without being followed by the actual boundary delimiter. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. |
| driftregion iso14229 through 0.9.0 contains an integer underflow and downstream out-of-bounds read in the Handle_0x27_SecurityAccess() function in iso14229.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash a UDS server and potentially read memory past the receive buffer by sending a single-byte 0x27 SecurityAccess request that follows any earlier well-formed 0x27 message. The handler reads the SecurityAccess subFunction from recv_buf[1] without first checking that recv_len is at least 2, then computes the key-data length as the unsigned subtraction (uint16_t)(recv_len - UDS_0X27_REQ_BASE_LEN); when recv_len equals 1 the result underflows to 65535 and is passed as args.len to the application's SecAccessValidateKey or SecAccessRequestSeed callback, which typically iterates or copies that many bytes from the 4-KB receive buffer. Every other UDS sub-function handler in the library (0x10, 0x11, 0x14, 0x19, 0x22, 0x23, 0x28, and others) performs an explicit recv_len lower-bound check before indexing; Handle_0x27_SecurityAccess is the sole outlier. The vulnerable handler reaches over CAN bus, OBD-II, ISO-TP, and DoIP transports and is exposed in the default diagnostic session without prior authentication; deployments on automotive ECUs, industrial controllers, and IoT devices that ship iso14229 as their UDS server are affected. |
| LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate compound request size before reading StructureSize2
When ksmbd validates a compound (chained) SMB2 request,
ksmbd_smb2_check_message() reads pdu->StructureSize2 without first
checking that the compound element is large enough to contain it.
StructureSize2 is a 2-byte field at offset 64
(__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE) from the start of each element.
The compound-walking logic only guarantees that a full 64-byte SMB2
header is present for the trailing element: when NextCommand is 0, len is
reduced to the number of bytes remaining after next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off. A
remote client can craft a compound request whose last element has exactly
64 bytes, so the 2-byte StructureSize2 read at offset 64 extends one byte
past the receive buffer, producing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888012ae31ac by task kworker/0:1/14
The buggy address is located 172 bytes inside of allocated 173-byte region
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:119)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Reject any compound element that is too small to hold StructureSize2
before dereferencing it. |
| An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in libsoup's multipart processing subsystem. The flaw exists in the soup_multipart_input_stream_read_headers() function inside soup-multipart-input-stream.c, which does not adequately restrict or validate the size of incoming multipart boundary strings. When processing a crafted HTTP response containing a malformed or oversized boundary parameter, the internal stream reader reads past the allocated buffer bounds. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this behavior to cause a service denial (DoS) through application failure or potentially read fragments of unauthorized memory metadata. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages
When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.
The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries:
num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);
So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.
To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = <N> here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the
array:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58
io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
__load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820)
load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017)
caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880)
btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312)
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc()
at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds
slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad
read turns into a GP fault.
Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry
loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now
fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds
the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()
p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a
device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds
that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in
p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a
fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len),
but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long
enough to supply that many bytes.
A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches
priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check
passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
...
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005)
...
</IRQ>
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of
allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380)
Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying. |
| A flaw was found in GStreamer's RealMedia demuxer in the gst-plugins-ugly package. When processing a RealMedia file containing a specially crafted FILEINFO metadata section, the demuxer parses variable-name and variable-value pairs using re_skip_pascal_string() without validating that offsets remain within the mapped buffer. Additionally, the element count controlling the parsing loop is read from attacker-controlled data without validation, which can cause an infinite loop. A crafted RealMedia file can cause the application to crash, hang, or potentially read limited adjacent memory contents. |
| A vulnerability was found in the GStreamer RealMedia demuxer (gst-plugins-ugly). When processing a RealMedia (.rm) file, the demuxer parses MDPR (media properties) chunks to configure audio streams. For audio stream header versions 4 and 5, the parser reads fields such as codec type, packet size, sample rate, channel count, and extra codec data length from fixed offsets within the chunk without first checking that the chunk contains enough data. If a malicious file provides an MDPR chunk that is too small to contain a complete audio stream header, the parser reads beyond the end of the buffer. This can cause the application to crash. In some cases, bytes read past the buffer boundary may be incorporated into stream metadata, which could result in limited information disclosure. |
| In ccci, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local denial of service if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS10981501; Issue ID: MSV-7669. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Tahoe 26.6, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
