| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| matrix-hookshot is a Matrix bot for connecting to external services like GitHub, GitLab, JIRA, and more. Instances that have enabled transformation functions (those that have `generic.allowJsTransformationFunctions` in their config), may be vulnerable to an attack where it is possible to break out of the `vm2` sandbox and as a result Hookshot will be vulnerable to this. This problem is only likely to affect users who have allowed untrusted users to apply their own transformation functions. If you have only enabled a limited set of trusted users, this threat is reduced (though not eliminated). Version 4.5.0 and above of hookshot include a new sandbox library which should better protect users. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should disable `generic.allowJsTransformationFunctions` in the config. |
| baserCMS is a website development framework. Prior to version 4.8.0, there is a cross site request forgery vulnerability in the content preview feature of baserCMS. Version 4.8.0 contains a patch for this issue. |
| baserCMS is a website development framework. Prior to version 4.8.0, there is a Directory Traversal Vulnerability in the form submission data management feature of baserCMS. Version 4.8.0 contains a patch for this issue. |
| baserCMS is a website development framework. Prior to version 4.8.0, there is a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the file upload feature of baserCMS. Version 4.8.0 contains a patch for this issue. |
| get-func-name is a module to retrieve a function's name securely and consistently both in NodeJS and the browser. Versions prior to 2.0.1 are subject to a regular expression denial of service (redos) vulnerability which may lead to a denial of service when parsing malicious input. This vulnerability can be exploited when there is an imbalance in parentheses, which results in excessive backtracking and subsequently increases the CPU load and processing time significantly. This vulnerability can be triggered using the following input: '\t'.repeat(54773) + '\t/function/i'. This issue has been addressed in commit `f934b228b` which has been included in releases from 2.0.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| OpenFGA is an authorization/permission engine built for developers and inspired by Google Zanzibar. OpenFGA is vulnerable to a denial of service attack when certain Check calls are executed against authorization models that contain circular relationship definitions. When the call is made, it's possible for the server to exhaust resources and die. Users are advised to upgrade to v1.3.2 and update any offending models. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. Note that for models which contained cycles or a relation definition that has the relation itself in its evaluation path, checks and queries that require evaluation will no longer be evaluated on v1.3.2+ and will return errors instead. Users who do not have cyclic models are unaffected. |
| Sing-box is an open source proxy system. Affected versions are subject to an authentication bypass when specially crafted requests are sent to sing-box. This affects all SOCKS5 inbounds with user authentication and an attacker may be able to bypass authentication. Users are advised to update to sing-box 1.4.4 or to 1.5.0-rc.4. Users unable to update should not expose the SOCKS5 inbound to insecure environments. |
| AntiSamy is a library for performing fast, configurable cleansing of HTML coming from untrusted sources. Prior to version 1.7.4, there is a potential for a mutation XSS (mXSS) vulnerability in AntiSamy caused by flawed parsing of the HTML being sanitized. To be subject to this vulnerability the `preserveComments` directive must be enabled in your policy file and also allow for certain tags at the same time. As a result, certain crafty inputs can result in elements in comment tags being interpreted as executable when using AntiSamy's sanitized output. This issue has been patched in AntiSamy 1.7.4 and later. |
| snappy-java is a Java port of the snappy, a fast C++ compresser/decompresser developed by Google. The SnappyInputStream was found to be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks when decompressing data with a too large chunk size. Due to missing upper bound check on chunk length, an unrecoverable fatal error can occur. All versions of snappy-java including the latest released version 1.1.10.3 are vulnerable to this issue. A fix has been introduced in commit `9f8c3cf74` which will be included in the 1.1.10.4 release. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should only accept compressed data from trusted sources. |
| TaxonWorks is a web-based workbench designed for taxonomists and biodiversity scientists. Prior to version 0.34.0, a SQL injection vulnerability was found in TaxonWorks that allows authenticated attackers to extract arbitrary data from the TaxonWorks database (including the users table). This issue may lead to information disclosure. Version 0.34.0 contains a fix for the issue.
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Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key
would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo".
This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always
return "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo" as the key), and then merges the 32byte
randomly generated key with this key (by takeing 16bytes from each, see "mergeKeys").
This makes the key a lot weaker.
This issue does not persist in devices that were initialized on/after version 7.10, but devices
that were initialized before that and updated to a newer version still have this issue.
Roll an update that enforces the full 32bytes key usage.
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|
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing
the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot
process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,
initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the
filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,
which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes
in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the
“mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
|
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.
Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.
These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.
This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.
This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.
The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.
The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:
• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.
• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.
An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
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|
When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs
are used.
In a previous project, CYMOTIVE found that the configuration is not protected by the secure
boot, and in response Zededa implemented measurements on the config partition that was
mapped to PCR 13.
In that process, PCR 13 was added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the key.
In commit “56e589749c6ff58ded862d39535d43253b249acf”, the config partition
measurement moved from PCR 13 to PCR 14, but PCR 14 was not added to the list of
PCRs that seal/unseal the key.
This change makes the measurement of PCR 14 effectively redundant as it would not affect
the sealing/unsealing of the key.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
|
|
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”.
If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot.
This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some
debug functions.
This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the
“debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before.
Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb”
key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more.
An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured
boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD”
(“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it
is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
|
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port
8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients.
VTPM allows clients to
execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options”
The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2
parts:
1. Header
2. Data
When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header,
and these 4 bytes would be parsed as uint32 size of the actual data to come.
Then, in the function “handleRequest” this size is then used in order to allocate a payload on
the stack for the incoming data.
As this payload is allocated on the stack, this will allow overflowing the stack size allocated for
the relevant process with freely controlled data.
* An attacker can crash the system.
* An attacker can gain control over the system, specifically on the “vtpm_server” process
which has very high privileges.
|
|
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/authorized_keys”.
If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.
An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
| PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but
due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the
problem of the config partition not being measured correctly.
Also, the “vault” key is sealed/unsealed with SHA1 PCRs instead of
SHA256.
This issue was somewhat mitigated due to all of the PCR extend functions
updating both the values of SHA256 and SHA1 for a given PCR ID.
However, due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, this is no longer the case for PCR14, as
the code in “measurefs.go” explicitly updates only the SHA256 instance of PCR14, which
means that even if PCR14 were to be added to the list of PCRs sealing/unsealing the “vault”
key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
|
| Path traversal vulnerability in ACERA 1320 firmware ver.01.26 and earlier, and ACERA 1310 firmware ver.01.26 and earlier allows a network-adjacent authenticated attacker to alter critical information such as system files by sending a specially crafted request. They are affected when running in ST(Standalone) mode. |
| CX-Designer Ver.3.740 and earlier (included in CX-One CXONE-AL[][]D-V4) contains an improper restriction of XML external entity reference (XXE) vulnerability. If a user opens a specially crafted project file created by an attacker, sensitive information in the file system where CX-Designer is installed may be disclosed. |
