| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Ghost allows an attacker to access internal resources.This issue affects Ghost: from 6.0.0 through 6.0.8, from 5.99.0 through 5.130.3. |
| A weakness has been identified in Portabilis i-Educar up to 2.10. This affects an unknown part of the file /module/Api/matricula of the component Matricula API. Executing manipulation can lead to improper authorization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. |
| CYRISMA Sensor before 444 for Windows has an Insecure Folder and File Permissions vulnerability. A low-privileged user can abuse these issues to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM by replacing DataSpotliteAgent.exe or any other binaries called by the Cyrisma_Agent service when it starts |
| A DLL hijacking vulnerability in CYRISMA Agent before 444 allows local users to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code via multiple DLLs. |
| An incorrect API discovered in Signify Wiz Connected 1.9.1 allows attackers to remotely launch a DoS on Wiz devices only requiring the MAC address. |
| The /api/comment endpoint in zhangyd-c OneBlog 2.3.9 contains a denial-of-service vulnerability. |
| A file quarantine bypass was addressed with additional checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox. |
| A permissions issue was addressed with additional restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| This issue was addressed with additional entitlement checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| An issue existed in the handling of environment variables. This issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Online Student File Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /admin/delete_user.php. The manipulation of the argument user_id leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: cs35l56: Fix lifetime of cs_dsp instance
The cs_dsp instance is initialized in the driver probe() so it
should be freed in the driver remove(). Also fix a missing call
to cs_dsp_remove() in the error path of cs35l56_hda_common_probe().
The call to cs_dsp_remove() was being done in the component unbind
callback cs35l56_hda_unbind(). This meant that if the driver was
unbound and then re-bound it would be using an uninitialized cs_dsp
instance.
It is best to initialize the cs_dsp instance in probe() so that it
can return an error if it fails. The component binding API doesn't
have any error handling so there's no way to handle a failure if
cs_dsp was initialized in the bind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.
The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short line; // 2 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
}
... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
< implicit padding > // 2 bytes
}
... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.
When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.
For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:
for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
return bug;
However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:
mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);
... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:
sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;
sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;
Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:
for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
goto out;
... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.
This can be demonstrated with the following module:
static int __init buginit(void)
{
WARN(1, "hello\n");
return 0;
}
static void __exit bugexit(void)
{
}
module_init(buginit);
module_exit(bugexit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:
------------[ cut here ]------------
hello
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: hello(O+)
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
sp : ffff800080533ae0
x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
Call trace:
buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
do_init_module+0x60/0x218
load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
__do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc
---truncated--- |
| NVIDIA ChatRTX for Windows contains a vulnerability in ChatRTX UI, where a user can cause an improper privilege management issue by exploiting interprocess communication between different processes. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure, escalation of privileges, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA ChatRTX for Windows contains a vulnerability in Chat RTX UI, where a user can cause an improper privilege management issue by sending user inputs to change execution flow. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure, escalation of privileges, and data tampering. |
| Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. Prior to versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20, any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the `server.fs` settings. Only apps that explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) and use `appType: 'spa'` (default) or `appType: 'mpa'` are affected. This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served. Versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20 fix the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()
syzbot reports a kernel bug as below:
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076
CPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline]
f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925
ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during
f2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access
nat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering
kasan bug report, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix oops during rmmod
"rmmod bonding" causes an oops ever since commit cc317ea3d927 ("bonding:
remove redundant NULL check in debugfs function"). Here are the relevant
functions being called:
bonding_exit()
bond_destroy_debugfs()
debugfs_remove_recursive(bonding_debug_root);
bonding_debug_root = NULL; <--------- SET TO NULL HERE
bond_netlink_fini()
rtnl_link_unregister()
__rtnl_link_unregister()
unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
bond_uninit()
bond_debug_unregister()
(commit removed check for bonding_debug_root == NULL)
debugfs_remove()
simple_recursive_removal()
down_write() -> OOPS
However, reverting the bad commit does not solve the problem completely
because the original code contains a race that could cause the same
oops, although it was much less likely to be triggered unintentionally:
CPU1
rmmod bonding
bonding_exit()
bond_destroy_debugfs()
debugfs_remove_recursive(bonding_debug_root);
CPU2
echo -bond0 > /sys/class/net/bonding_masters
bond_uninit()
bond_debug_unregister()
if (!bonding_debug_root)
CPU1
bonding_debug_root = NULL;
So do NOT revert the bad commit (since the removed checks were racy
anyway), and instead change the order of actions taken during module
removal. The same oops can also happen if there is an error during
module init, so apply the same fix there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "xsk: Support redirect to any socket bound to the same umem"
This reverts commit 2863d665ea41282379f108e4da6c8a2366ba66db.
This patch introduced a potential kernel crash when multiple napi instances
redirect to the same AF_XDP socket. By removing the queue_index check, it is
possible for multiple napi instances to access the Rx ring at the same time,
which will result in a corrupted ring state which can lead to a crash when
flushing the rings in __xsk_flush(). This can happen when the linked list of
sockets to flush gets corrupted by concurrent accesses. A quick and small fix
is not possible, so let us revert this for now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios
[BUG]
Since v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by various people,
the common factor is bad page status error messages like this:
BUG: Bad page state in process kswapd0 pfn:d6e840
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007512f4f2 index:0x2796c2c7c
pfn:0xd6e840
aops:btree_aops ino:1
flags: 0x17ffffe0000008(uptodate|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0017ffffe0000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88826d0be4c0
raw: 00000002796c2c7c 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: non-NULL mapping
[CAUSE]
Commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to
allocate-then-attach method") changes the sequence when allocating a new
extent buffer.
Previously we always called grab_extent_buffer() under
mapping->i_private_lock, to ensure the safety on modification on
folio::private (which is a pointer to extent buffer for regular
sectorsize).
This can lead to the following race:
Thread A is trying to allocate an extent buffer at bytenr X, with 4
4K pages, meanwhile thread B is trying to release the page at X + 4K
(the second page of the extent buffer at X).
Thread A | Thread B
-----------------------------------+-------------------------------------
| btree_release_folio()
| | This is for the page at X + 4K,
| | Not page X.
| |
alloc_extent_buffer() | |- release_extent_buffer()
|- filemap_add_folio() for the | | |- atomic_dec_and_test(eb->refs)
| page at bytenr X (the first | | |
| page). | | |
| Which returned -EEXIST. | | |
| | | |
|- filemap_lock_folio() | | |
| Returned the first page locked. | | |
| | | |
|- grab_extent_buffer() | | |
| |- atomic_inc_not_zero() | | |
| | Returned false | | |
| |- folio_detach_private() | | |- folio_detach_private() for X
| |- folio_test_private() | | |- folio_test_private()
| Returned true | | | Returned true
|- folio_put() | |- folio_put()
Now there are two puts on the same folio at folio X, leading to refcount
underflow of the folio X, and eventually causing the BUG_ON() on the
page->mapping.
The condition is not that easy to hit:
- The release must be triggered for the middle page of an eb
If the release is on the same first page of an eb, page lock would kick
in and prevent the race.
- folio_detach_private() has a very small race window
It's only between folio_test_private() and folio_clear_private().
That's exactly when mapping->i_private_lock is used to prevent such race,
and commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to
allocate-then-attach method") screwed that up.
At that time, I thought the page lock would kick in as
filemap_release_folio() also requires the page to be locked, but forgot
the filemap_release_folio() only locks one page, not all pages of an
extent buffer.
[FIX]
Move all the code requiring i_private_lock into
attach_eb_folio_to_filemap(), so that everything is done with proper
lock protection.
Furthermore to prevent future problems, add an extra
lockdep_assert_locked() to ensure we're holding the proper lock.
To reproducer that is able to hit the race (takes a few minutes with
instrumented code inserting delays to alloc_extent_buffer()):
#!/bin/sh
drop_caches () {
while(true); do
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory
done
}
run_tar () {
while(true); do
for x in `seq 1 80` ; do
tar cf /dev/zero /mnt > /dev/null &
done
wait
done
}
mkfs.btrfs -f -d single -m single
---truncated--- |
