| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it
When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the
parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the
parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone
lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is
copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for
MGLRU.
The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took
over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it:
folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later
update_lru_size() for those folios goes there.
Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still
walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them.
get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and
the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against
an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the
MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of
NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node
limit just the same.
On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380
counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB,
1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with
CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported
byte-identical sizes.
LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not
spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is
imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by
lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the
parent from here on.
This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as
its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that
invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already
spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec
until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of
memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets
lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in
mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: synopsys: dw-dp: Support unregistering the AUX channel
The DisplayPort AUX channel gets initialized and registered during
dw_dp_bind(), but it is never unregistered, which may lead to resource
leaks and/or use-after-free.
Add the missing dw_dp_unbind() function to allow the users of the
library to handle the required cleanup, i.e. unregister the AUX adapter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Release core resources
Core resources such as the DisplayPort AUX channel get initialized and
registered during dw_dp_bind(), but are never unregistered, which may
lead to memory leaks and/or use-after-free:
[ 224.661371] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662015] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00011aee8550 by task modprobe/658
[ 224.662612]
[ 224.662752] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260305 #14 PREEMPT
[ 224.662759] Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
[ 224.662762] Call trace:
[ 224.662764] show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
[ 224.662772] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x98
[ 224.662777] print_report+0x160/0x4b8
[ 224.662783] kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
[ 224.662790] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
[ 224.662796] device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662802] device_is_dependent+0x108/0x2b0
[ 224.662808] device_link_add+0x1f8/0x10b0
[ 224.662813] devm_of_phy_get_by_index+0x120/0x200
[ 224.662819] dw_dp_bind+0x34c/0xb10 [dw_dp]
[ 224.662830] dw_dp_rockchip_bind+0x194/0x250 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662864] component_bind_all+0x3a8/0x720
[ 224.662869] rockchip_drm_bind+0x120/0x390 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662899] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x76c/0x838
[ 224.662904] component_master_add_with_match+0x1f4/0x230
[ 224.662909] rockchip_drm_platform_probe+0x420/0x538 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662939] platform_probe+0xe8/0x168
[ 224.662945] really_probe+0x340/0x828
[ 224.662950] __driver_probe_device+0x2e0/0x350
[ 224.662954] driver_probe_device+0x80/0x140
[ 224.662959] __driver_attach+0x398/0x460
[ 224.662964] bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x198
[ 224.662968] driver_attach+0x50/0x68
[ 224.662972] bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x4c0
[ 224.662977] driver_register+0x294/0x360
[ 224.662982] __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x98
[ 224.662987] rockchip_drm_init+0xc4/0xff8 [rockchipdrm]
Since a previous commit exported dw_dp_unbind() function in DW DP core
library to take care of the necessary cleanup, use this in the
component's unbind() callback, as well as in its bind() error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup
Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(),
the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a
symmetrical way [1].
Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to
automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv
The smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() function incorrectly checks
the permissions of the 'current' task instead of the
'target' task.
In the msgsnd() syscall path, if a receiver is already waiting,
the pipelined_send() optimization is used to push the message
directly to the receiver task:
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` smp_store_release(&msr->r_msg, msg)
In this case, the 'sender' (current) task performs the check
on behalf of the 'receiver' task (msr->r_tsk, passed as the
'target' parameter):
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` security_msg_queue_msgrcv(,, target := msr->r_tsk,,)
However, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() ignores the 'target' and
checks 'current':
smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(…)
` smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE); // current task
'current' MAY satisfy smack_msg_queue_msgrcv r/w requirement,
but 'target' (the receiver task) might NOT;
as a result, an unauthorized receiver gets the message,
violating MAC policy.
Test:
1) create a sysv message queue with label “foo”
2) echo "bar foo r" >/smack/load2
3) msgrcv(,,,0,MSG_NOERROR) in "bar"-labeled task.
The task is waiting for the messages ...
4) msgsnd() from a "foo"-labeled task:
"bar"-labeled task gets the message.
This patch fixes the issue by checking permission on the
'target' task instead of 'current'.
(2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
kone_keep_values_up_to_date() and kone_profile_activated() use an
8-bit, device-supplied profile value as an index into the 5-element
kone->profiles[] array without a range check. A malicious USB device
claiming the Roccat Kone id can send a switch-profile event (or a
startup_profile read at probe) with an out-of-range value and make the
driver read out of bounds; the result is exposed via the actual_dpi
sysfs attribute.
Reject out-of-range indices in both paths.
This was found with static analysis and confirmed with the KUnit test
added in the following patch (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Return error for invalid number of formats
When the number of input or output formats is zero,
sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_src() and sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_asrc()
print an error and jump to the cleanup label. At that point 'ret' is
still 0, because the earlier sof_ipc4_get_audio_fmt() call succeeded, so
the function returns success and the caller never finds out that the
widget setup actually failed.
Set ret to -EINVAL before the goto so the error gets reported. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size
CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND bounds the user's in.size to the mailbox payload
size but leaves out.size unbounded, then cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor() calls
kvzalloc(out.size). A large out.size drives a huge allocation, above
INT_MAX it WARNs and taints, and with panic_on_warn=1 it panics.
The transport __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() already clamps the response copy
to min(out.size, payload_size, device len), so the output buffer is
never written beyond payload_size. Clamp the allocation to payload_size
too, matching the RAW path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove
rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only
when rt700->hw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by
rt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a
jack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback()
or rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized.
Do not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work
objects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove
can cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the
codec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by
manual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The
remove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not
on a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued.
A QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and
then entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object
associated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel.
This is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire
core remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot
run after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this
is a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current
systems. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: fsl_audmix: rework runtime PM handling in probe
After pm_runtime_enable() the AUDMIX block is powered off and stays
suspended until the first runtime resume. Register writes issued between
probe() and the first resume (e.g. from DAPM or ALSA control paths)
target unpowered hardware and cause a system hang.
Fix this by calling pm_runtime_resume_and_get() immediately after
pm_runtime_enable() to power the hardware up and enable its clocks.
Release the reference afterwards with pm_runtime_put() to allow the
runtime PM framework to suspend the device and switch the regmap to
cache-only mode when idle.
When CONFIG_PM is disabled or runtime PM is not enabled, pm_runtime_*
calls are stubs that do not power up the hardware. Handle this case
explicitly by calling fsl_audmix_runtime_resume() directly so the
hardware is always initialised and its clocks are enabled, ensuring
register accesses succeed regardless of PM configuration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/lima: call drm_mm_init() with a valid allocation range
lima_vm_create() is currently run before va_start and va_end are set up,
meaning they are both 0. lima_vm_create() runs drm_mm_init() with them
as arguments for the allocator, and if DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled the
DRM_MM_BUG_ON check in drm_mm_init then fires, as seen here on
exynos4412-odroid-u2:
[ 1.736297] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1.740370] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mm.c:931!
[ 1.745574] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
[ 1.750697] Modules linked in:
[ 1.753734] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 41 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 7.0.10-postmarketos-exynos4 #11 PREEMPT
[ 1.763372] Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree)
[ 1.769446] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 1.775261] PC is at drm_mm_init+0x9c/0xa4
[ 1.779339] LR is at lima_vm_create+0x144/0x17c
[ ... ]
Fix the issue by moving the lima_vm_create() call after va_start and
va_end are set up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix overflow in update_tg_cfs_runnable()
A divide-by-zero crash is observed when running hackbench:
[14697.488452] CPU: 112 UID: 0 PID: 124791 Comm: hackbench Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2+
[14697.492627] RIP: 0010:propagate_entity_load_avg+0x35f/0x3e0
[14697.506799] <TASK>
[14697.507411] __dequeue_task+0x2b4/0xc70
[14697.508677] dequeue_task_fair+0x36/0x370
[14697.509047] dequeue_task+0x101/0x2f0
[14697.509426] __schedule+0x1b1/0x1a00
[14697.510868] anon_pipe_read+0x3da/0x450
[14697.511400] vfs_read+0x361/0x390
[14697.512053] __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x30
The divide-by-zero happens here:
if (scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight)) {
load_sum = div_u64(gcfs_rq->avg.load_sum,
scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight));
}
gcfs_rq->load.weight is an insane large value and is truncated
to the lower 32 bits by div_u64, which happen to be 0.
Using AI for investigation, the cause is a u32 overflow in
update_tg_cfs_runnable(), and flat pickup became a victim when using
tg_tasks():
u32 new_sum, divider;
...
new_sum = se->avg.runnable_avg * divider; <-- boom
The following sequence shows how this triggers the crash:
propagate_entity_load_avg()
update_tg_cfs_runnable() # u32 overflow corrupts runnable_sum
__update_load_avg_cfs_rq()
___update_load_avg() # computes insane runnable_avg
update_tg_load_avg() # propagates to tg->runnable_avg
update_cfs_group()
calc_concur_shares()
tg_tasks() # long-to-int truncation, negative nr
reweight_entity() # corrupted se->load.weight
update_load_add() # corrupted cfs_rq->load.weight
propagate_entity_load_avg()
update_tg_cfs_load()
div_u64() # divide-by-zero
Fix by widening new_sum from u32 to u64 (no need to force tg_tasks()
to return unsigned long after this fix) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix uncore_box ref/unref ordering
In uncore_event_cpu_online(), uncore_box_ref() was called before
uncore_change_context(). uncore_box_ref() gates on box->cpu >= 0,
but box->cpu is still -1 at that point because uncore_change_context()
has not run yet. As a result, the box is never initialized on the
first CPU to come online in a die, leaving it permanently
uninitialized in the single-CPU-per-die case.
Thus, box->refcnt is one count below the true value, and in the CPU
offline path, the box will be torn down on the second-to-last CPU.
In uncore_event_cpu_offline(), uncore_box_unref() was called after
uncore_change_context(), so box->cpu is already -1 when the collector
CPU goes offline, which prevents it from tearing down the box.
Fix by swapping the call order in both paths so that
uncore_box_{ref,unref}() runs at the point where box->cpu reflects
the correct context.
Move allocate_boxes() out of uncore_box_ref() to enable this
reordering. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/powerplay: fix VoltageObjectInfo zero-stride loop and OOB read
Reject voltage objects whose usSize is smaller than the header or would
advance the cursor past the table end, preventing an infinite loop or
heap OOB read when the VBIOS supplies a malformed VoltageObjectInfo table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Copy per-CPU map value padding in copy_map_value_long()
In kernel, per-CPU map elements are stored with
round_up(map->value_size, 8) bytes. On UAPI lookup paths, it copies the
rounded size for each CPU into a temporary buffer.
However, copy_map_value_long() passes 'map->value_size' to
bpf_obj_memcpy(). When the map has special fields, bpf_obj_memcpy() copies
around those fields with memcpy(), and does not copy the tail padding
between 'map->value_size' and round_up(map->value_size, 8).
The temporary UAPI lookup buffers are allocated without __GFP_ZERO. As a
result, when the per-CPU map's value size is not equal to
round_up(map->value_size, 8), UAPI LOOKUP_ELEM and its variants can return
stale heap contents from that padding to user space. The same issue
applies to bpf_iter for per-CPU maps.
Pass round_up(map->value_size, 8) to bpf_obj_memcpy() from
copy_map_value_long(), so per-CPU maps both with and without special
fields copy the entire per-CPU slot. Remove the now redundant round_up()
from bpf_obj_memcpy()'s long_memcpy path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf,lsm: Drop bpf_prog_free from sleepable_lsm_hooks
__bpf_prog_put_rcu() is the call_rcu() callback for non-sleepable programs.
security_bpf_prog_free() called from there fires bpf_prog_free in softirq;
if a sleepable LSM prog is attached to that hook, might_fault() BUGs:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5038
preempt_count: 101, expected: 0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x1cd/0x320 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:1255
bpf_trampoline_6442549705+0x53/0xd7
security_bpf_prog_free+0xde/0x130 security/security.c:5465
__bpf_prog_put_rcu+0xab/0xd0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2365
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 [inline]
handle_softirqs+0x236/0x800 kernel/softirq.c:622
</IRQ>
The call_rcu/call_rcu_tasks_trace split reflects the freed program's
sleepability, not that of any attached observer.
security_bpf_prog_free() also frees prog->aux->security, which has to stay
after the grace period, so drop bpf_prog_free from sleepable_lsm_hooks
rather than move the call. Non-sleepable observers still run there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mm_init: handle alloc_percpu failure in free_area_init_core_hotplug
We miss a failed allocation check for pgdat->per_cpu_nodestats, which
results in a NULL deref when we offset into the per-cpu area.
Propagate -ENOMEM up the stack and leave per_cpu_nodestats pointing
at boot_nodestats so a later online can retry the allocation.
hotadd_init_pgdat() returns NULL on failure, which __try_online_node()
already maps to -ENOMEM.
On failure nothing needs to be unwound:
- the node is never marked online
- per_cpu_nodestats is left pointing at boot_nodestats
- __add_memory_resource() cleans up pending memblock resources
- later online attempts retry the per_cpu_nodestats allocation |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: lp5860: Fix a potential double-unlock
In lp5860_device_init(), if lp5860_init_dt() fails, an already unlocked
mutex is unlocked another time.
Slightly rework how the lock is taken/released to avoid this potential
double unlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: zynqmp_dma: fix race between runtime PM and device removal
In zynqmp_dma_remove(), runtime PM was disabled only after checking
state and doing a manual suspend. This can race with runtime PM in the
remove/unbind (rmmod) path.
Disable runtime PM first, then suspend only if the device is not already
suspended. To prevent any further runtime PM transitions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout
Currently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a
condition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time
and the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.
This happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in
poll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 ("iopoll: Do not use
timekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()") changed the behavior to no
longer use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock
time which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing
out after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout
takes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for
loop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several
minutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero
value for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of
starting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of
unexpected hardware failures.
One-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7
minutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10
the measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly
equivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in
XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.
Add a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value. |
