| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
8021q: delete cleared egress QoS mappings
vlan_dev_set_egress_priority() currently keeps cleared egress
priority mappings in the hash as tombstones. Repeated set/clear cycles
with distinct skb priorities therefore accumulate mapping nodes until
device teardown and leak memory.
Delete mappings when vlan_prio is cleared instead of keeping tombstones.
Now that the egress mapping lists are RCU protected, the node can be
unlinked safely and freed after a grace period. |
| An issue was discovered in Malwarebytes 4.x and 5.x (and Nebula 2020-10-21 and later). A large number of Firefox preference files can cause the parser to ignore other browser configuration files, leading to a denial of service. |
| A markdown based cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the AI assistant chat function of FastapiAdmin v2.2.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via injecting a crafted payload into a chat message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).
Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:
1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size
The KASAN splat would look similar to:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Read of size N at addr ... by task ...
The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:
0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
allocates old_log with size X
2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds
8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap
Requirements:
- a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size
(almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it
can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and
the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size)
- pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default)
- Non-fatal oops (system survives)
Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the
previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient
space for the data being copied. |
| Applications which accept user-supplied Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions may be vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack if the evaluation of a SpEL expression triggers unbounded cache growth.
Affected versions:
Spring Framework 7.0.0 through 7.0.7; 6.2.0 through 6.2.18; 6.1.0 through 6.1.27; 5.3.0 through 5.3.48. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Recover from panthor_gpu_flush_caches() failures
We have seen a few cases where the whole memory subsystem is blocked
and flush operations never complete. When that happens, we want to:
- schedule a reset, so we can recover from this situation
- in the reset path, we need to reset the pending_reqs so we can send
new commands after the reset
- if more panthor_gpu_flush_caches() operations are queued after
the timeout, we skip them and return -EIO directly to avoid needless
waits (the memory block won't miraculously work again)
Note that we drop the WARN_ON()s because these hangs can be triggered
with buggy GPU jobs created by the UMD, and there's no way we can
prevent it. We do keep the error messages though.
v2:
- New patch
v3:
- Collect R-b
- Explicitly mention the fact we dropped the WARN_ON()s in the commit
message
v4:
- No changes |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') in Azure Stack Edge allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| Out of bounds memory access in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Microsoft is aware of a security feature bypass vulnerability in Windows publicly referred to as "YellowKey". The proof of concept for this vulnerability has been made public violating coordinated vulnerability best practices.
We are issuing this CVE to provide mitigation guidance that can be implemented to protect against this vulnerability until the security update is made available.
Mitigation FAQs
Should I leverage the temporary mitigation?
Microsoft recommends that you consider implementing these mitigations if you are concerned your devices and data are at risk of being compromised or stolen. For example, if your organization’s employees take their work devices home or on business travel.
What impact to service availability/management could be caused by implementing the mitigations?
Implementing these mitigations will not impact service availability or management operations.
Do customers need to revert the changes made to mitigate the vulnerability once the security update to protect against this vulnerability is available?
No. The security update will maintain the mitigation's behavior once the security update is installed.
I am using TPM+PIN, am I at risk of this vulnerability being exploited
No, if you are using TPM+PIN the vulnerability is not exploitable. |
| The MailerPress – Email Marketing, Newsletter, Email Automation & WooCommerce Emails plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Campaign HTML Content Field in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The public-facing campaign preview endpoint (/mp-email/{id}-slug/) is not affected by this vulnerability, as it applies a Content-Security-Policy header blocking all inline scripts; exploitation is limited to the admin dashboard preview. |
| Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Media in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| An OS command injection vulnerability in Ivanti EPMM before 12.9.0.1, 12.8.0.3 and 12.7.0.2 versions allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root |
| Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability |
| .NET, .NET Framework, and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability |
| Microsoft OpenSSH for Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft OpenSSH for Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Visual Studio Code for Linux Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft OpenSSH for Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Hermes WebUI before version 0.51.270 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to degrade service availability by repeatedly calling the passkey options endpoint without completing assertion. Attackers can send unlimited POST requests to the authentication endpoint, causing unbounded growth of the challenge store file and excessive CPU and disk I/O through repeated JSON file rewrites. |
| DBI versions before 1.648 for Perl saved errors in a limited-sized buffer.
Error messages that were returned when RaiseError, PrintError or HandleError were set were written to a 200-byte buffer without a length limit.
Attackers that can influence the error text in an application can trigger a buffer overflow. |
