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Search Results (24 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-48983 | 2 Arm, Mbed | 2 Mbed, Mbed | 2024-11-25 | 7.5 High |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet data by reading 2 bytes from the packet header. A buffer is then allocated to contain the entire packet, the size of which is calculated as the length of the packet body determined earlier plus the header length. WsfMsgAlloc then increments this again by sizeof(wsfMsg_t). This may cause an integer overflow that results in the buffer being significantly too small to contain the entire packet. This may cause a buffer overflow of up to 65 KB . This bug is trivial to exploit for a denial of service but can generally not be exploited further because the exploitable buffer is dynamically allocated. | ||||
| CVE-2024-48982 | 2 Arm, Mbed | 2 Mbed, Mbed | 2024-11-25 | 7.5 High |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. Its hci parsing software dynamically determines the length of certain hci packets by reading a byte from its header. This value is assumed to be greater than or equal to 3, but the software doesn't ensure that this is the case. Supplying a length less than 3 leads to a buffer overflow in a buffer that is allocated later. It is simultaneously possible to cause another integer overflow by supplying large length values because the provided length value is increased by a few bytes to account for additional information that is supposed to be stored there. This bug is trivial to exploit for a denial of service but is not certain to suffice to bring the system down and can generally not be exploited further because the exploitable buffer is dynamically allocated. | ||||
| CVE-2019-17212 | 1 Mbed | 1 Mbed | 2024-11-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| Buffer overflows were discovered in the CoAP library in Arm Mbed OS 5.14.0. The CoAP parser is responsible for parsing received CoAP packets. The function sn_coap_parser_options_parse() parses CoAP input linearly using a while loop. Once an option is parsed in a loop, the current point (*packet_data_pptr) is increased correspondingly. The pointer is restricted by the size of the received buffer, as well as by the 0xFF delimiter byte. Inside each while loop, the check of the value of *packet_data_pptr is not strictly enforced. More specifically, inside a loop, *packet_data_pptr could be increased and then dereferenced without checking. Moreover, there are many other functions in the format of sn_coap_parser_****() that do not check whether the pointer is within the bounds of the allocated buffer. All of these lead to heap-based or stack-based buffer overflows, depending on how the CoAP packet buffer is allocated. | ||||
| CVE-2019-17211 | 1 Mbed | 1 Mbed | 2024-11-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| An integer overflow was discovered in the CoAP library in Arm Mbed OS 5.14.0. The function sn_coap_builder_calc_needed_packet_data_size_2() is used to calculate the required memory for the CoAP message from the sn_coap_hdr_s data structure. Both returned_byte_count and src_coap_msg_ptr->payload_len are of type uint16_t. When added together, the result returned_byte_count can wrap around the maximum uint16_t value. As a result, insufficient buffer space is allocated for the corresponding CoAP message. | ||||