Sending certain HTTP/2 frames can cause a server to panic in golang.org/x/net
Due to missing nil check, sending 0x0a-0x0f HTTP/2 frames will cause a running server to panic
Due to missing nil check, sending 0x0a-0x0f HTTP/2 frames will cause a running server to panic
When using http.CrossOriginProtection, the AddInsecureBypassPattern method can unexpectedly bypass more requests than intended. CrossOriginProtection then skips validation, but forwards the original request path, which may be served by a different handler without the intended security protections.
The ParseAddressList function incorrectly handles comments (text within parentheses) within display names. Since this is a misalignment with conforming address parsers, it can result in different trust decisions being made by programs using different parsers.
An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.
The net/http HTTP/1.1 client mishandled the case where a server responds to a request with an "Expect: 100-continue" header with a non-informational (200 or higher) status. This mishandling could leave a client connection in an invalid state, where the next request sent on the connection will fail. An attacker sending a request to a net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy proxy can exploit this mishandling to cause a denial of service by sending "Expect: 100-continue" requests which elicit a non-informational response from the backend. Each such request leaves the proxy with an invalid connection, and causes one subsequent request using that connection to fail.
Calling Decoder.Decode on a message which contains deeply nested structures can cause a panic due to stack exhaustion. This is a follow-up to CVE-2022-30635.
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.