| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential overflow of PCM transfer buffer
The PCM stream data in USB-audio driver is transferred over USB URB
packet buffers, and each packet size is determined dynamically. The
packet sizes are limited by some factors such as wMaxPacketSize USB
descriptor. OTOH, in the current code, the actually used packet sizes
are determined only by the rate and the PPS, which may be bigger than
the size limit above. This results in a buffer overflow, as reported
by syzbot.
Basically when the limit is smaller than the calculated packet size,
it implies that something is wrong, most likely a weird USB
descriptor. So the best option would be just to return an error at
the parameter setup time before doing any further operations.
This patch introduces such a sanity check, and returns -EINVAL when
the packet size is greater than maxpacksize. The comparison with
ep->packsize[1] alone should suffice since it's always equal or
greater than ep->packsize[0]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: client: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param
The user calls fsconfig twice, but when the program exits, free() only
frees ctx->source for the second fsconfig, not the first.
Regarding fc->source, there is no code in the fs context related to its
memory reclamation.
To fix this memory leak, release the source memory corresponding to ctx
or fc before each parsing.
syzbot reported:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888128afa360 (size 96):
backtrace (crc 79c9c7ba):
kstrdup+0x3c/0x80 mm/util.c:84
smb3_fs_context_parse_param+0x229b/0x36c0 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:1444
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888112c7d900 (size 96):
backtrace (crc 79c9c7ba):
smb3_fs_context_fullpath+0x70/0x1b0 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:629
smb3_fs_context_parse_param+0x2266/0x36c0 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:1438 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: ensure allocated iovec gets cleared for early failure
A previous commit reused the recyling infrastructure for early cleanup,
but this is not enough for the case where our internal caches have
overflowed. If this happens, then the allocated iovec can get leaked if
the request is also aborted early.
Reinstate the previous forced free of the iovec for that situation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
be2net: pass wrb_params in case of OS2BMC
be_insert_vlan_in_pkt() is called with the wrb_params argument being NULL
at be_send_pkt_to_bmc() call site. This may lead to dereferencing a NULL
pointer when processing a workaround for specific packet, as commit
bc0c3405abbb ("be2net: fix a Tx stall bug caused by a specific ipv6
packet") states.
The correct way would be to pass the wrb_params from be_xmit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cros_ec_keyb - fix an invalid memory access
If cros_ec_keyb_register_matrix() isn't called (due to
`buttons_switches_only`) in cros_ec_keyb_probe(), `ckdev->idev` remains
NULL. An invalid memory access is observed in cros_ec_keyb_process()
when receiving an EC_MKBP_EVENT_KEY_MATRIX event in cros_ec_keyb_work()
in such case.
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000028
...
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
input_event
cros_ec_keyb_work
blocking_notifier_call_chain
ec_irq_thread
It's still unknown about why the kernel receives such malformed event,
in any cases, the kernel shouldn't access `ckdev->idev` and friends if
the driver doesn't intend to initialize them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: imx_sc_key - fix memory corruption on unload
This is supposed to be "priv" but we accidentally pass "&priv" which is
an address in the stack and so it will lead to memory corruption when
the imx_sc_key_action() function is called. Remove the &. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: nvme-fc: Ensure ->ioerr_work is cancelled in nvme_fc_delete_ctrl()
nvme_fc_delete_assocation() waits for pending I/O to complete before
returning, and an error can cause ->ioerr_work to be queued after
cancel_work_sync() had been called. Move the call to cancel_work_sync() to
be after nvme_fc_delete_association() to ensure ->ioerr_work is not running
when the nvme_fc_ctrl object is freed. Otherwise the following can occur:
[ 1135.911754] list_del corruption, ff2d24c8093f31f8->next is NULL
[ 1135.917705] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1135.922336] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52!
[ 1135.926784] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 1135.931851] CPU: 48 UID: 0 PID: 726 Comm: kworker/u449:23 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 1135.943490] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R660/0HGTK9, BIOS 2.5.4 01/16/2025
[ 1135.950969] Workqueue: 0x0 (nvme-wq)
[ 1135.954673] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0xf/0x6f
[ 1135.961041] Code: c7 c7 98 68 72 94 e8 26 45 fe ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 70 68 72 94 e8 18 45 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 80 69 72 94 e8 07 45 fe ff <0f> 0b 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 a0 6a 72 94 48 89 c2 e8 f3 44 fe ff 0f 0b
[ 1135.979788] RSP: 0018:ff579b19482d3e50 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 1135.985015] RAX: 0000000000000033 RBX: ff2d24c8093f31f0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1135.992148] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff2d24d6bfa1d0c0 RDI: ff2d24d6bfa1d0c0
[ 1135.999278] RBP: ff2d24c8093f31f8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff951e2b08
[ 1136.006413] R10: ffffffff95122ac8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ff2d24c78697c100
[ 1136.013546] R13: fffffffffffffff8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff2d24c78697c0c0
[ 1136.020677] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2d24d6bfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1136.028765] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1136.034510] CR2: 00007fd207f90b80 CR3: 000000163ea22003 CR4: 0000000000f73ef0
[ 1136.041641] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1136.048776] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1136.055910] PKRU: 55555554
[ 1136.058623] Call Trace:
[ 1136.061074] <TASK>
[ 1136.063179] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 1136.067540] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 1136.071898] ? move_linked_works+0x4a/0xa0
[ 1136.075998] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0xf/0x6f
[ 1136.081744] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
[ 1136.085584] ? die+0x2e/0x50
[ 1136.088469] ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
[ 1136.091789] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
[ 1136.095543] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0xf/0x6f
[ 1136.101289] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 1136.105127] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0xf/0x6f
[ 1136.110874] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 1136.115059] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0xf/0x6f
[ 1136.120806] move_linked_works+0x4a/0xa0
[ 1136.124733] worker_thread+0x216/0x3a0
[ 1136.128485] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1136.132758] kthread+0xfa/0x240
[ 1136.135904] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1136.139657] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[ 1136.143236] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1136.146988] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 1136.150915] </TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: sg: Do not sleep in atomic context
sg_finish_rem_req() calls blk_rq_unmap_user(). The latter function may
sleep. Hence, call sg_finish_rem_req() with interrupts enabled instead
of disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix race condition in mptcp_schedule_work()
syzbot reported use-after-free in mptcp_schedule_work() [1]
Issue here is that mptcp_schedule_work() schedules a work,
then gets a refcount on sk->sk_refcnt if the work was scheduled.
This refcount will be released by mptcp_worker().
[A] if (schedule_work(...)) {
[B] sock_hold(sk);
return true;
}
Problem is that mptcp_worker() can run immediately and complete before [B]
We need instead :
sock_hold(sk);
if (schedule_work(...))
return true;
sock_put(sk);
[1]
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 29 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfa/0x1d0 lib/refcount.c:25
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline]
__refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline]
refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline]
sock_hold include/net/sock.h:816 [inline]
mptcp_schedule_work+0x164/0x1a0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:943
mptcp_tout_timer+0x21/0xa0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2316
call_timer_fn+0x17e/0x5f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1798 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2372 [inline]
__run_timer_base+0x648/0x970 kernel/time/timer.c:2384
run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2393 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x180 kernel/time/timer.c:2403
handle_softirqs+0x22f/0x710 kernel/softirq.c:622
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline]
run_ktimerd+0xcf/0x190 kernel/softirq.c:1138
smpboot_thread_fn+0x542/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix a race in mptcp_pm_del_add_timer()
mptcp_pm_del_add_timer() can call sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, &entry->add_timer)
while another might have free entry already, as reported by syzbot.
Add RCU protection to fix this issue.
Also change confusing add_timer variable with stop_timer boolean.
syzbot report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __timer_delete_sync+0x372/0x3f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1616
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880311e4150 by task kworker/1:1/44
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025
Workqueue: events mptcp_worker
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__timer_delete_sync+0x372/0x3f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1616
sk_stop_timer_sync+0x1b/0x90 net/core/sock.c:3631
mptcp_pm_del_add_timer+0x283/0x310 net/mptcp/pm.c:362
mptcp_incoming_options+0x1357/0x1f60 net/mptcp/options.c:1174
tcp_data_queue+0xca/0x6450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5361
tcp_rcv_established+0x1335/0x2670 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6441
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x98b/0xbf0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1931
tcp_v4_rcv+0x252a/0x2dc0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2374
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x221/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3bb/0x6f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:239
NF_HOOK+0x30c/0x3a0 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
NF_HOOK+0x30c/0x3a0 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6079 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x143/0x380 net/core/dev.c:6192
process_backlog+0x31e/0x900 net/core/dev.c:6544
__napi_poll+0xb6/0x540 net/core/dev.c:7594
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7657 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x5f7/0xda0 net/core/dev.c:7784
handle_softirqs+0x22f/0x710 kernel/softirq.c:622
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1a0/0x2e0 kernel/softirq.c:302
mptcp_pm_send_ack net/mptcp/pm.c:210 [inline]
mptcp_pm_addr_send_ack+0x41f/0x500 net/mptcp/pm.c:-1
mptcp_pm_worker+0x174/0x320 net/mptcp/pm.c:1002
mptcp_worker+0xd5/0x1170 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2762
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3263 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3346
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3427
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Allocated by task 44:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:77
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:400 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:417
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:262 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1ef/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5748
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline]
mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list+0x104/0x460 net/mptcp/pm.c:385
mptcp_pm_create_subflow_or_signal_addr+0xf9d/0x1360 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:355
mptcp_pm_nl_fully_established net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:409 [inline]
__mptcp_pm_kernel_worker+0x417/0x1ef0 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1529
mptcp_pm_worker+0x1ee/0x320 net/mptcp/pm.c:1008
mptcp_worker+0xd5/0x1170 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2762
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3263 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3346
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3427
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
Freed by task 6630:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:77
__kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:587
kasan_save_free_info mm/kasan/kasan.h:406 [inline]
poison_slab_object m
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields
The validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong.
It runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the
same function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the
push_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different
memory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in
case of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible.
There is also confusion in the code between the 'masked' flag, that
says that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both
the value and the mask, and the 'is_mask' that says that the value
we're parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to
write into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during
validation, while validate_nsh() doesn't allocate any memory for it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch]
validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch]
__ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch]
ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220
genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
____sys_sendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0
___sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0
__sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The third issue with this process is that while trying to convert
the non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles
the size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn't have any nested
attributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling
them in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed
during the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during
the flow dump.
In the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are
either validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone
manages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely
not do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are
mixed up.
Fixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing
most of the validation code.
Given that and the fact that this functionality never worked since
introduction, let's just remove it altogether. It's better to
re-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying
to fix it in stable releases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/ctcm: Fix double-kfree
The function 'mpc_rcvd_sweep_req(mpcginfo)' is called conditionally
from function 'ctcmpc_unpack_skb'. It frees passed mpcginfo.
After that a call to function 'kfree' in function 'ctcmpc_unpack_skb'
frees it again.
Remove 'kfree' call in function 'mpc_rcvd_sweep_req(mpcginfo)'.
Bug detected by the clang static analyzer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qlogic/qede: fix potential out-of-bounds read in qede_tpa_cont() and qede_tpa_end()
The loops in 'qede_tpa_cont()' and 'qede_tpa_end()', iterate
over 'cqe->len_list[]' using only a zero-length terminator as
the stopping condition. If the terminator was missing or
malformed, the loop could run past the end of the fixed-size array.
Add an explicit bound check using ARRAY_SIZE() in both loops to prevent
a potential out-of-bounds access.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established
During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already
established socket leads to several issues:
1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() ->
virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking
virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated
`vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling.
2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket
being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap
breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs.
3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a
transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for
any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a
use-after-free/null-ptr-deref.
Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected
sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by
sendmsg().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e07fd95c-9a38-4eea-9638-133e38c2ec9b@rbox.co/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250317-vsock-trans-signal-race-v4-0-fc8837f3f1d4@rbox.co/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/60f1b7db-3099-4f6a-875e-af9f6ef194f6@rbox.co/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().
Quang Le reported that the AF_UNIX GC could garbage-collect a
receive queue of an alive in-flight socket, with a nice repro.
The repro consists of three stages.
1)
1-a. Create a single cyclic reference with many sockets
1-b. close() all sockets
1-c. Trigger GC
2)
2-a. Pass sk-A to an embryo sk-B
2-b. Pass sk-X to sk-X
2-c. Trigger GC
3)
3-a. accept() the embryo sk-B
3-b. Pass sk-B to sk-C
3-c. close() the in-flight sk-A
3-d. Trigger GC
As of 2-c, sk-A and sk-X are linked to unix_unvisited_vertices,
and unix_walk_scc() groups them into two different SCCs:
unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->scc_index = 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)
unix_sk(sk-X)->vertex->scc_index = 3
Once GC completes, unix_graph_grouped is set to true.
Also, unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is set to true due to sk-X's
cyclic self-reference, which makes close() trigger GC.
At 3-b, unix_add_edge() allocates unix_sk(sk-B)->vertex and
links it to unix_unvisited_vertices.
unix_update_graph() is called at 3-a. and 3-b., but neither
unix_graph_grouped nor unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is changed
because both sk-B's listener and sk-C are not in-flight.
3-c decrements sk-A's file refcnt to 1.
Since unix_graph_grouped is true at 3-d, unix_walk_scc_fast()
is finally called and iterates 3 sockets sk-A, sk-B, and sk-X:
sk-A -> sk-B (-> sk-C)
sk-X -> sk-X
This is totally fine. All of them are not yet close()d and
should be grouped into different SCCs.
However, unix_vertex_dead() misjudges that sk-A and sk-B are
in the same SCC and sk-A is dead.
unix_sk(sk-A)->scc_index == unix_sk(sk-B)->scc_index <-- Wrong!
&&
sk-A's file refcnt == unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->out_degree
^-- 1 in-flight count for sk-B
-> sk-A is dead !?
The problem is that unix_add_edge() does not initialise scc_index.
Stage 1) is used for heap spraying, making a newly allocated
vertex have vertex->scc_index == 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)
set by unix_walk_scc() at 1-c.
Let's track the max SCC index from the previous unix_walk_scc()
call and assign the max + 1 to a new vertex's scc_index.
This way, we can continue to avoid Tarjan's algorithm while
preventing misjudgments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: video: Fix use-after-free in acpi_video_switch_brightness()
The switch_brightness_work delayed work accesses device->brightness
and device->backlight, freed by acpi_video_dev_unregister_backlight()
during device removal.
If the work executes after acpi_video_bus_unregister_backlight()
frees these resources, it causes a use-after-free when
acpi_video_switch_brightness() dereferences device->brightness or
device->backlight.
Fix this by calling cancel_delayed_work_sync() for each device's
switch_brightness_work in acpi_video_bus_remove_notify_handler()
after removing the notify handler that queues the work. This ensures
the work completes before the memory is freed.
[ rjw: Changelog edit ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix null-deref in agg_dequeue
To prevent a potential crash in agg_dequeue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c)
when cl->qdisc->ops->peek(cl->qdisc) returns NULL, we check the return
value before using it, similar to the existing approach in sch_hfsc.c.
To avoid code duplication, the following changes are made:
1. Changed qdisc_warn_nonwc(include/net/pkt_sched.h) into a static
inline function.
2. Moved qdisc_peek_len from net/sched/sch_hfsc.c to
include/net/pkt_sched.h so that sch_qfq can reuse it.
3. Applied qdisc_peek_len in agg_dequeue to avoid crashing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/ksm: fix flag-dropping behavior in ksm_madvise
syzkaller discovered the following crash: (kernel BUG)
[ 44.607039] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 44.607422] kernel BUG at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067!
[ 44.608148] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[ 44.608814] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2475 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(none)
[ 44.609635] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 44.610695] RIP: 0010:userfaultfd_release_all+0x3a8/0x460
<snip other registers, drop unreliable trace>
[ 44.617726] Call Trace:
[ 44.617926] <TASK>
[ 44.619284] userfaultfd_release+0xef/0x1b0
[ 44.620976] __fput+0x3f9/0xb60
[ 44.621240] fput_close_sync+0x110/0x210
[ 44.622222] __x64_sys_close+0x8f/0x120
[ 44.622530] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x2f0
[ 44.622840] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 44.623244] RIP: 0033:0x7f365bb3f227
Kernel panics because it detects UFFD inconsistency during
userfaultfd_release_all(). Specifically, a VMA which has a valid pointer
to vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, but no UFFD flags in vma->vm_flags.
The inconsistency is caused in ksm_madvise(): when user calls madvise()
with MADV_UNMEARGEABLE on a VMA that is registered for UFFD in MINOR mode,
it accidentally clears all flags stored in the upper 32 bits of
vma->vm_flags.
Assuming x86_64 kernel build, unsigned long is 64-bit and unsigned int and
int are 32-bit wide. This setup causes the following mishap during the &=
~VM_MERGEABLE assignment.
VM_MERGEABLE is a 32-bit constant of type unsigned int, 0x8000'0000.
After ~ is applied, it becomes 0x7fff'ffff unsigned int, which is then
promoted to unsigned long before the & operation. This promotion fills
upper 32 bits with leading 0s, as we're doing unsigned conversion (and
even for a signed conversion, this wouldn't help as the leading bit is 0).
& operation thus ends up AND-ing vm_flags with 0x0000'0000'7fff'ffff
instead of intended 0xffff'ffff'7fff'ffff and hence accidentally clears
the upper 32-bits of its value.
Fix it by changing `VM_MERGEABLE` constant to unsigned long, using the
BIT() macro.
Note: other VM_* flags are not affected: This only happens to the
VM_MERGEABLE flag, as the other VM_* flags are all constants of type int
and after ~ operation, they end up with leading 1 and are thus converted
to unsigned long with leading 1s.
Note 2:
After commit 31defc3b01d9 ("userfaultfd: remove (VM_)BUG_ON()s"), this is
no longer a kernel BUG, but a WARNING at the same place:
[ 45.595973] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2474 at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067
but the root-cause (flag-drop) remains the same.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: rust bindgen wasn't able to handle BIT(), from Miguel] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty()
An use-after-free issue occurred when __mark_inode_dirty() get the
bdi_writeback that was in the progress of switching.
CPU: 1 PID: 562 Comm: systemd-random- Not tainted 6.6.56-gb4403bd46a8e #1
......
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
lr : __mark_inode_dirty+0x118/0x418
sp : ffffffc08c9dbbc0
........
Call trace:
__mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
generic_update_time+0x4c/0x60
file_modified+0xcc/0xd0
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x58/0x124
ext4_file_write_iter+0x54/0x704
vfs_write+0x1c0/0x308
ksys_write+0x74/0x10c
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x40/0xe4
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
Root cause is:
systemd-random-seed kworker
----------------------------------------------------------------------
___mark_inode_dirty inode_switch_wbs_work_fn
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode_attach_wb
locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list
get inode->i_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_lock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode_io_list_move_locked
spin_unlock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_lock(&old_wb->list_lock)
inode_do_switch_wbs
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode->i_wb = new_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_unlock(&old_wb->list_lock)
wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched)
cgwb_release
old wb released
wb_wakeup_delayed() accesses wb,
then trigger the use-after-free
issue
Fix this race condition by holding inode spinlock until
wb_wakeup_delayed() finished. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: fix unregister_netdev call order in macb_remove()
When removing a macb device, the driver calls phy_exit() before
unregister_netdev(). This leads to a WARN from kernfs:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernfs: can not remove 'attached_dev', no directory
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 27146 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1683
Call trace:
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xd8/0xf0
sysfs_remove_link+0x24/0x58
phy_detach+0x5c/0x168
phy_disconnect+0x4c/0x70
phylink_disconnect_phy+0x6c/0xc0 [phylink]
macb_close+0x6c/0x170 [macb]
...
macb_remove+0x60/0x168 [macb]
platform_remove+0x5c/0x80
...
The warning happens because the PHY is being exited while the netdev
is still registered. The correct order is to unregister the netdev
before shutting down the PHY and cleaning up the MDIO bus.
Fix this by moving unregister_netdev() ahead of phy_exit() in
macb_remove(). |
