| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| subsys/net/ip/icmpv6.c reads the network interface from a net_pkt after that packet has been handed to net_try_send_data(). In icmpv6_handle_echo_request() and net_icmpv6_send_error(), the post-send statistics update calls net_pkt_iface(reply)/net_pkt_iface(pkt) on the just-sent packet. The send path (net_try_send_data - net_if_tx) unreferences and may free the packet back to its memory slab before returning — synchronously in the RX thread when no TX queue is configured (CONFIG_NET_TC_TX_COUNT == 0), and asynchronously the driver/L2 may already have freed it otherwise. net_pkt_iface() therefore dereferences a freed (and possibly reused) net_pkt; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stale iface pointer is further dereferenced and written through (iface-stats.icmp.sent++), turning the use-after-free read into a write through an attacker-influenceable pointer. The core stack already documents this hazard in net_core.c ("do not use pkt after that call") and caches iface before sending; the ICMPv6 callers did not. An unauthenticated remote attacker triggers the flaw simply by sending an ICMPv6 Echo Request (ping) or an IPv6 packet that elicits an ICMPv6 error (unknown next header, fragment reassembly timeout, destination unreachable), leading to denial of service via crash and potential memory corruption. Affected: Zephyr networking with CONFIG_NET_NATIVE_IPV6, roughly v4.2.0 through v4.4.0. The fix caches the interface pointer before sending and uses it for all statistics updates; the sibling commit 86e21665d46 fixes the identical bug in ICMPv4. |
| In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').
The post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply-iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.
The path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).
The defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates. |
| Zephyr's IPv6 Neighbor Discovery send paths (net_ipv6_send_na, net_ipv6_send_ns, net_ipv6_send_rs in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c) updated the per-interface ICMP-sent statistics by calling net_pkt_iface(pkt) after net_send_data(pkt) had already returned successfully. On the success path the network stack owns and releases the packet's reference (the L2/driver send unrefs it, e.g. ethernet_send - net_pkt_unref), so for a freshly allocated packet with refcount 1 the net_pkt slab block can be freed before the statistics line runs (synchronously when no TX queue thread is configured, or via a concurrent TX thread otherwise).
The subsequent net_pkt_iface(pkt) reads pkt-iface from the freed slab block, and with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE enabled that loaded pointer is dereferenced to increment iface-stats.icmp.sent, a use-after-free (CWE-416). If the slab block was reallocated in the meantime the read/increment targets unrelated or attacker-influenced memory, yielding corrupted statistics, a fault/crash (denial of service), or potential limited memory corruption.
The vulnerable Neighbor Advertisement path is reachable by any unauthenticated on-link node simply by sending ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitations to a Zephyr node with native IPv6 enabled (handle_ns_input - net_ipv6_send_na).
Affected from v3.3.0 through v4.4.0; the fix uses the already-available iface argument instead of touching the sent packet. Configurations without per-interface statistics dereference only a global counter and are not affected by the memory-safety aspect. |
| Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the 'net conn' network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0. |
| dns_unpack_name() caches the buffer tailroom once and reuses it while appending DNS labels. As the buffer grows, the cached size becomes incorrect, and the final null terminator can be written past the buffer. With assertions disabled (default), a malicious DNS response can trigger an out-of-bounds write when CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER is enabled. |
| In preloader, there is a possible read of device unique identifiers due to a logic error. This could lead to local information disclosure, if an attacker has physical access to the device, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS10607099; Issue ID: MSV-6118. |
| Issues in stm32 USB device driver (drivers/usb/device/usb_dc_stm32.c) can lead to an infinite while loop. |
| Malformed ATAES132A responses with an oversized length field overflow a 52-byte stack buffer in the Zephyr crypto driver, allowing a compromised device or bus attacker to corrupt kernel memory and potentially hijack execution. |
| The eswifi socket offload driver copies user-provided payloads into a fixed buffer without checking available space; oversized sends overflow `eswifi->buf`, corrupting kernel memory (CWE-120). Exploit requires local code that can call the socket send API; no remote attacker can reach it directly. |
| In gnss service, there is a possible out of bounds write due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS10010441; Issue ID: MSV-3967. |
| In gnss service, there is a possible out of bounds write due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS10010443; Issue ID: MSV-3966. |
| A denial-of-service issue in the dns implemenation could cause an infinite loop. |
| The function responsible for handling BLE connection responses does not verify whether a response is expected—that is, whether the device has initiated a connection request. Instead, it relies solely on identifier matching. |
| A vulnerability was identified in the handling of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) fixed channels (such as SMP or ATT). Specifically, an attacker could exploit a flaw that causes the BLE target (i.e., the device under attack) to attempt to disconnect a fixed channel, which is not allowed per the Bluetooth specification. This leads to undefined behavior, including potential assertion failures, crashes, or memory corruption, depending on the BLE stack implementation. |
| Parameters are not validated or sanitized, and are later used in various internal operations. |
| Unsafe handling in bt_conn_tx_processor causes a use-after-free, resulting in a write-before-zero. The written 4 bytes are attacker-controlled, enabling precise memory corruption. |
| No proper validation of the length of user input in http_server_get_content_type_from_extension. |
| BT: Encryption procedure host vulnerability |
| BT: Classic: SDP OOB access in get_att_search_list |
| BT: HCI: adv_ext_report Improper discarding in adv_ext_report |
