| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in NEC Corporation Aterm WG1800HP4, WG1200HS3, WG1900HP2, WG1200HP3, WG1800HP3, WG1200HS2, WG1900HP, WG1200HP2, W1200EX(-MS), WG1200HS, WG1200HP, WF300HP2, W300P, WF800HP, WR8165N, WG2200HP, WF1200HP2, WG1800HP2, WF1200HP, WG600HP, WG300HP, WF300HP, WG1800HP, WG1400HP, WR8175N, WR9300N, WR8750N, WR8160N, WR9500N, WR8600N, WR8370N, WR8170N, WR8700N, WR8300N, WR8150N, WR4100N, WR4500N, WR8100N, WR8500N, CR2500P, WR8400N, WR8200N, WR1200H, WR7870S, WR6670S, WR7850S, WR6650S, WR6600H, WR7800H, WM3400RN, WM3450RN, WM3500R, WM3600R, WM3800R, WR8166N, MR01LN MR02LN, WG1810HP(JE) and WG1810HP(MF) all versions allows a attacker to execute an arbitrary command via the internet. |
| Potential buffer overflow
in unsafe UEFI variable handling
in Phoenix SecureCore™ for Intel Gemini Lake.This issue affects:
SecureCore™ for Intel Gemini Lake: from 4.1.0.1 before 4.1.0.567. |
| A vulnerability was found in D-Link DCS-935L up to 1.13.01. The impacted element is the function sub_402280 of the file /HNAP1/. The manipulation of the argument HNAP_AUTH/SOAPAction results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. |
| Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2 lacks proper validation of the user-supplied file. If a user opens a malicious file, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. |
| Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2 lacks proper validation of the user-supplied file. If a user opens a malicious file, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in WellinTech KingSCADA before 3.1.2.13 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in BKBCopyD.exe in Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.09.50 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted TCP packet. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in BKHOdeq.exe in Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.09.50 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted TCP packet. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in BKESimmgr.exe in the Expanded Test Functions package in Yokogawa CENTUM CS 1000, CENTUM CS 3000 Entry Class R3.09.50 and earlier, CENTUM VP R5.03.00 and earlier, CENTUM VP Entry Class R5.03.00 and earlier, Exaopc R3.71.02 and earlier, B/M9000CS R5.05.01 and earlier, and B/M9000 VP R7.03.01 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. The GIMP ani_load_image() function is vulnerable to a stack-based overflow. If a user opens.ANI files, GIMP may be used to store more information than the capacity allows. This flaw allows a malicious ANI file to trigger arbitrary code execution. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in the C++ sample client in Schneider Electric OPC Factory Server (OFS) TLXCDSUOFS33 - 3.35, TLXCDSTOFS33 - 3.35, TLXCDLUOFS33 - 3.35, TLXCDLTOFS33 - 3.35, and TLXCDLFOFS33 - 3.35 allows local users to gain privileges via vectors involving a malformed configuration file. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in Teamcenter Visualization V14.2 (All versions < V14.2.0.14), Teamcenter Visualization V14.3 (All versions < V14.3.0.12), Teamcenter Visualization V2312 (All versions < V2312.0008), Tecnomatix Plant Simulation V2302 (All versions < V2302.0016), Tecnomatix Plant Simulation V2404 (All versions < V2404.0005). The affected applications contain a stack based overflow vulnerability while parsing specially crafted WRL files.
This could allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the current process. (ZDI-CAN-25000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially
never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd
crash due to that stack overflowing.
Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely
luck that we aren't corrupting something else.
To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on
entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for
pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the
existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the
emergency stack. |
| Sysax Multi Server versions prior to 5.55 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in its SSH service. When a remote attacker supplies an overly long username during authentication, the server copies the input to a fixed-size stack buffer without proper bounds checking. This allows remote code execution under the context of the service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: add ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() helper
Inspired by syzbot reports using a stack of multiple ipvlan devices.
Reduce stack size needed in ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() by moving
the flowi6 struct used for the route lookup in an non inlined
helper. ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() needs 120 bytes on the stack,
immediately reclaimed.
Also make sure ipvlan_process_v4_outbound() is not inlined.
We might also have to lower MAX_NEST_DEV, because only syzbot uses
setups with more than four stacked devices.
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000e803ff8 (stack is ffffc9000e804000..ffffc9000e808000)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 13442 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.52-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x4/0x2a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:188
Code: 48 01 c6 48 89 c7 e8 db 4e c1 03 31 c0 5d c3 cc 0f 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 cc 00 00 cc cc 00 00 cc cc 55 48 89 e5 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 b0 01 48 85 f6 0f 84 a4 01 00 00 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e804000 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817e5bf2
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff887c6568
RBP: ffffc9000e804000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 1ffff92001d0080c
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff87e6b100 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fd0c55826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881f6800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000e803ff8 CR3: 0000000170ef7000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<#DF>
</#DF>
<TASK>
[<ffffffff81f281d1>] __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:72 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpumask_test_cpu include/linux/cpumask.h:506 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpu_online include/linux/cpumask.h:1092 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] lock_acquire+0xe2/0x590 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5632
[<ffffffff8563221e>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x2e/0x40 include/linux/rcupdate.h:306
[<ffffffff8561464d>] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline]
[<ffffffff8561464d>] ip6_pol_route+0x15d/0x1440 net/ipv6/route.c:2221
[<ffffffff85618120>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x50/0x80 net/ipv6/route.c:2606
[<ffffffff856f65b5>] pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:584 [inline]
[<ffffffff856f65b5>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x265/0x620 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:116
[<ffffffff85618009>] ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2d9/0x3a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2638
[<ffffffff8561821a>] ip6_route_output_flags+0xca/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:100 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:473 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xc33/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677
[<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229
[<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660
[<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324
[<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline]
[<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline]
[<f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-blk: fix implicit overflow on virtio_max_dma_size
The following codes have an implicit conversion from size_t to u32:
(u32)max_size = (size_t)virtio_max_dma_size(vdev);
This may lead overflow, Ex (size_t)4G -> (u32)0. Once
virtio_max_dma_size() has a larger size than U32_MAX, use U32_MAX
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe
commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added
support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to
`shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu
`overflow_stack`.
If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one
or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is
not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by
directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`.
Following are the changes in this patch
- Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination
register.
- In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is
located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires
a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH
(CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel).
Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative
solution.
Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT`
Kernel crash log below
Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000]
Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370]
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc
ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80
gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88
t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0
s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000
a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff
s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90
s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684
s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10
s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4
t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38
[<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c
[<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c
[<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe
[<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0
[<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: avoid format-overflow warning
With gcc and W=1 option, there's a warning like this:
fs/f2fs/compress.c: In function ‘f2fs_init_page_array_cache’:
fs/f2fs/compress.c:1984:47: error: ‘%u’ directive writing between
1 and 7 bytes into a region of size between 5 and 8
[-Werror=format-overflow=]
1984 | sprintf(slab_name, "f2fs_page_array_entry-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev),
MINOR(dev));
| ^~
String "f2fs_page_array_entry-%u:%u" can up to 35. The first "%u" can up
to 4 and the second "%u" can up to 7, so total size is "24 + 4 + 7 = 35".
slab_name's size should be 35 rather than 32. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the my_cgi.cgi component of certain D-Link devices, including the DSP-W215 version 1.02, can be exploited via a specially crafted HTTP POST request to the /common/info.cgi endpoint. This flaw enables an unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution with system-level privileges. |
| Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'), Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional (Core Libraries) allows Overflow Variables and Tags.This issue affects Connext Professional: from 7.4.0 before 7.5.0, from 7.0.0 before 7.3.0.7, from 6.1.0 before 6.1.2.23, from 6.0.0 before 6.0.1.42, from 5.3.0 before 5.3.*, from 4.5c before 5.2.*. |
