| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: Do not bother merging very long extents
When merging very long extents we try to push as much length as possible
to the first extent. However this is unnecessarily complicated and not
really worth the trouble. Furthermore there was a bug in the logic
resulting in corrupting extents in the file as syzbot reproducer shows.
So just don't bother with the merging of extents that are too long
together. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: tegra: tegra124-emc: Fix potential memory leak
The tegra and tegra needs to be freed in the error handling path, otherwise
it will be leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Properly order ib_device_unalloc() to avoid UAF
ib_dealloc_device() should be called only after device cleanup. Fix the
dealloc sequence. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: allow ext4_get_group_info() to fail
Previously, ext4_get_group_info() would treat an invalid group number
as BUG(), since in theory it should never happen. However, if a
malicious attaker (or fuzzer) modifies the superblock via the block
device while it is the file system is mounted, it is possible for
s_first_data_block to get set to a very large number. In that case,
when calculating the block group of some block number (such as the
starting block of a preallocation region), could result in an
underflow and very large block group number. Then the BUG_ON check in
ext4_get_group_info() would fire, resutling in a denial of service
attack that can be triggered by root or someone with write access to
the block device.
For a quality of implementation perspective, it's best that even if
the system administrator does something that they shouldn't, that it
will not trigger a BUG. So instead of BUG'ing, ext4_get_group_info()
will call ext4_error and return NULL. We also add fallback code in
all of the callers of ext4_get_group_info() that it might NULL.
Also, since ext4_get_group_info() was already borderline to be an
inline function, un-inline it. The results in a next reduction of the
compiled text size of ext4 by roughly 2k. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd/iommu_v2: Fix pasid_state refcount dec hit 0 warning on pasid unbind
When unbinding pasid - a race condition exists vs outstanding page faults.
To prevent this, the pasid_state object contains a refcount.
* set to 1 on pasid bind
* incremented on each ppr notification start
* decremented on each ppr notification done
* decremented on pasid unbind
Since refcount_dec assumes that refcount will never reach 0:
the current implementation causes the following to be invoked on
pasid unbind:
REFCOUNT_WARN("decrement hit 0; leaking memory")
Fix this issue by changing refcount_dec to refcount_dec_and_test
to explicitly handle refcount=1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets.
The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0
kasan_report+0x11d/0x130
decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
__xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0
xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30
__qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10
neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550
ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550
ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270
ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540
ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890
ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0
addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0
run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30
Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 <fa> 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50
RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d
R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0
cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0
do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0
cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20
start_secondary+0x200/0x290
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b
</TASK>
Allocated by task 939:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410
kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270
__alloc_skb+0x129/0x330
inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230
__ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00
addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390
process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0
worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0
kthread+0x344/0x440
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80)
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix error unwinding of XDP initialization
When initializing XDP in virtnet_open(), some rq xdp initialization
may hit an error causing net device open failed. However, previous
rqs have already initialized XDP and enabled NAPI, which is not the
expected behavior. Need to roll back the previous rq initialization
to avoid leaks in error unwinding of init code.
Also extract helper functions of disable and enable queue pairs.
Use newly introduced disable helper function in error unwinding and
virtnet_close. Use enable helper function in virtnet_open. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix potential null dereference
The adev->dm.dc pointer can be NULL and dereferenced in amdgpu_dm_fini()
without checking.
Add a NULL pointer check before calling dc_dmub_srv_destroy().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vsp1: Replace vb2_is_streaming() with vb2_start_streaming_called()
The vsp1 driver uses the vb2_is_streaming() function in its .buf_queue()
handler to check if the .start_streaming() operation has been called,
and decide whether to just add the buffer to an internal queue, or also
trigger a hardware run. vb2_is_streaming() relies on the vb2_queue
structure's streaming field, which used to be set only after calling the
.start_streaming() operation.
Commit a10b21532574 ("media: vb2: add (un)prepare_streaming queue ops")
changed this, setting the .streaming field in vb2_core_streamon() before
enqueuing buffers to the driver and calling .start_streaming(). This
broke the vsp1 driver which now believes that .start_streaming() has
been called when it hasn't, leading to a crash:
[ 881.058705] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020
[ 881.067495] Mem abort info:
[ 881.070290] ESR = 0x0000000096000006
[ 881.074042] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 881.079358] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 881.082414] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 881.085558] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
[ 881.090439] Data abort info:
[ 881.093320] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
[ 881.097157] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 881.100126] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000004fa51000
[ 881.106573] [0000000000000020] pgd=080000004f36e003, p4d=080000004f36e003, pud=080000004f7ec003, pmd=0000000000000000
[ 881.117217] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 881.123494] Modules linked in: rcar_fdp1 v4l2_mem2mem
[ 881.128572] CPU: 0 PID: 1271 Comm: yavta Tainted: G B 6.2.0-rc1-00023-g6c94e2e99343 #556
[ 881.138061] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
[ 881.145981] pstate: 400000c5 (nZcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 881.152951] pc : vsp1_dl_list_add_body+0xa8/0xe0
[ 881.157580] lr : vsp1_dl_list_add_body+0x34/0xe0
[ 881.162206] sp : ffff80000c267710
[ 881.165522] x29: ffff80000c267710 x28: ffff000010938ae8 x27: ffff000013a8dd98
[ 881.172683] x26: ffff000010938098 x25: ffff000013a8dc00 x24: ffff000010ed6ba8
[ 881.179841] x23: ffff00000faa4000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000020
[ 881.186998] x20: ffff00000faa4000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 881.194154] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 881.201309] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 746e696174206c65 x12: ffff70000157043d
[ 881.208465] x11: 1ffff0000157043c x10: ffff70000157043c x9 : dfff800000000000
[ 881.215622] x8 : ffff80000ab821e7 x7 : 00008ffffea8fbc4 x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 881.222779] x5 : ffff80000ab821e0 x4 : ffff70000157043d x3 : 0000000000000020
[ 881.229936] x2 : 0000000000000020 x1 : ffff00000e4f6400 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 881.237092] Call trace:
[ 881.239542] vsp1_dl_list_add_body+0xa8/0xe0
[ 881.243822] vsp1_video_pipeline_run+0x270/0x2a0
[ 881.248449] vsp1_video_buffer_queue+0x1c0/0x1d0
[ 881.253076] __enqueue_in_driver+0xbc/0x260
[ 881.257269] vb2_start_streaming+0x48/0x200
[ 881.261461] vb2_core_streamon+0x13c/0x280
[ 881.265565] vb2_streamon+0x3c/0x90
[ 881.269064] vsp1_video_streamon+0x2fc/0x3e0
[ 881.273344] v4l_streamon+0x50/0x70
[ 881.276844] __video_do_ioctl+0x2bc/0x5d0
[ 881.280861] video_usercopy+0x2a8/0xc80
[ 881.284704] video_ioctl2+0x20/0x40
[ 881.288201] v4l2_ioctl+0xa4/0xc0
[ 881.291525] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xe8/0x110
[ 881.295543] invoke_syscall+0x68/0x190
[ 881.299303] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x170
[ 881.304105] do_el0_svc+0x4c/0xf0
[ 881.307430] el0_svc+0x4c/0xa0
[ 881.310494] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
[ 881.314773] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[ 881.318450] Code: d50323bf d65f03c0 91008263 f9800071 (885f7c60)
[ 881.324551] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 881.329173] note: yavta[1271] exited with preempt_count 1
A different r
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/platform/uv: Use alternate source for socket to node data
The UV code attempts to build a set of tables to allow it to do
bidirectional socket<=>node lookups.
But when nr_cpus is set to a smaller number than actually present, the
cpu_to_node() mapping information for unused CPUs is not available to
build_socket_tables(). This results in skipping some nodes or sockets
when creating the tables and leaving some -1's for later code to trip.
over, causing oopses.
The problem is that the socket<=>node lookups are created by doing a
loop over all CPUs, then looking up the CPU's APICID and socket. But
if a CPU is not present, there is no way to start this lookup.
Instead of looping over all CPUs, take CPUs out of the equation
entirely. Loop over all APICIDs which are mapped to a valid NUMA node.
Then just extract the socket-id from the APICID.
This avoid tripping over disabled CPUs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mvpp2_main: fix possible OOB write in mvpp2_ethtool_get_rxnfc()
rules is allocated in ethtool_get_rxnfc and the size is determined by
rule_cnt from user space. So rule_cnt needs to be check before using
rules to avoid OOB writing or NULL pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctly
As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message()
Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message().
This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is
enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative
size later.
if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the
msg->data.
if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr))
return -EINVAL;
Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size:
if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in
decode_passthrough() when we do.
memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr));
And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow:
if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id
When adding a rule to a chain referring to its ID, if that chain had been
deleted on the same batch, the rule might end up referring to a deleted
chain.
This will lead to a WARNING like following:
[ 33.098431] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 33.098678] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 69 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2037 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.099217] Modules linked in:
[ 33.099388] CPU: 5 PID: 69 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.4.0+ #409
[ 33.099726] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
[ 33.100018] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.100306] Code: 8b 7c 24 68 e8 64 9c ed fe 4c 89 e7 e8 5c 9c ed fe 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7
[ 33.101271] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004ffc48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 33.101546] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888006fc0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 33.101920] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 33.102649] RBP: ffffc900004ffc78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 33.103018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880135ef500
[ 33.103385] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff888006fc0a10
[ 33.103762] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888024c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 33.104184] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 33.104493] CR2: 00007fe863b56a50 CR3: 00000000124b0001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 33.104872] PKRU: 55555554
[ 33.104999] Call Trace:
[ 33.105113] <TASK>
[ 33.105214] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[ 33.105371] ? __warn+0xa5/0x210
[ 33.105520] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.105732] ? report_bug+0x1f2/0x200
[ 33.105902] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[ 33.106546] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[ 33.106762] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 33.106995] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.107249] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x30/0x260
[ 33.107506] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x669/0x680
[ 33.107782] ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[ 33.107996] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10
[ 33.108294] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x70
[ 33.108538] process_one_work+0x68c/0xb70
[ 33.108755] ? lock_acquire+0x17f/0x420
[ 33.108977] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[ 33.109218] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x128/0x1d0
[ 33.109435] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x71/0x80
[ 33.109634] worker_thread+0x2bd/0x700
[ 33.109817] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 33.110254] kthread+0x18b/0x1d0
[ 33.110410] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 33.110581] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[ 33.110757] </TASK>
[ 33.110866] irq event stamp: 1651
[ 33.111017] hardirqs last enabled at (1659): [<ffffffffa206a209>] __up_console_sem+0x79/0xa0
[ 33.111379] hardirqs last disabled at (1666): [<ffffffffa206a1ee>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0xa0
[ 33.111740] softirqs last enabled at (1616): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[ 33.112094] softirqs last disabled at (1367): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[ 33.112453] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This is due to the nft_chain_lookup_byid ignoring the genmask. After this
change, adding the new rule will fail as it will not find the chain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix disconnect vs accept race
Despite commit 0ad529d9fd2b ("mptcp: fix possible divide by zero in
recvmsg()"), the mptcp protocol is still prone to a race between
disconnect() (or shutdown) and accept.
The root cause is that the mentioned commit checks the msk-level
flag, but mptcp_stream_accept() does acquire the msk-level lock,
as it can rely directly on the first subflow lock.
As reported by Christoph than can lead to a race where an msk
socket is accepted after that mptcp_subflow_queue_clean() releases
the listener socket lock and just before it takes destructive
actions leading to the following splat:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012
PGD 5a4ca067 P4D 5a4ca067 PUD 37d4c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 10955 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-gdc7b257ee5dd #37
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mptcp_stream_accept+0x1ee/0x2f0 include/net/inet_sock.h:330
Code: 0a 09 00 48 8b 1b 4c 39 e3 74 07 e8 bc 7c 7f fe eb a1 e8 b5 7c 7f fe 4c 8b 6c 24 08 eb 05 e8 a9 7c 7f fe 49 8b 85 d8 09 00 00 <0f> b6 40 12 88 44 24 07 0f b6 6c 24 07 bf 07 00 00 00 89 ee e8 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d07dc0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888037e8d020 RCX: ffff88803b093300
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff833822c5 RDI: ffffffff8333896a
RBP: 0000607f82031520 R08: ffff88803b093300 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000003e83 R12: ffff888037e8d020
R13: ffff888037e8c680 R14: ffff888009af7900 R15: ffff888009af6880
FS: 00007fc26d708640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000066bc5001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_accept+0x1ae/0x260 net/socket.c:1872
__sys_accept4+0x9b/0x110 net/socket.c:1913
__do_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1954 [inline]
__se_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1951 [inline]
__x64_sys_accept4+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:1951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x47/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Address the issue by temporary removing the pending request socket
from the accept queue, so that racing accept() can't touch them.
After depleting the msk - the ssk still exists, as plain TCP sockets,
re-insert them into the accept queue, so that later inet_csk_listen_stop()
will complete the tcp socket disposal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp/udp: Fix memleaks of sk and zerocopy skbs with TX timestamp.
syzkaller reported [0] memory leaks of an UDP socket and ZEROCOPY
skbs. We can reproduce the problem with these sequences:
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)
sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING, SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE)
sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROCOPY, 1)
sk.sendto(b'', MSG_ZEROCOPY, ('127.0.0.1', 53))
sk.close()
sendmsg() calls msg_zerocopy_alloc(), which allocates a skb, sets
skb->cb->ubuf.refcnt to 1, and calls sock_hold(). Here, struct
ubuf_info_msgzc indirectly holds a refcnt of the socket. When the
skb is sent, __skb_tstamp_tx() clones it and puts the clone into
the socket's error queue with the TX timestamp.
When the original skb is received locally, skb_copy_ubufs() calls
skb_unclone(), and pskb_expand_head() increments skb->cb->ubuf.refcnt.
This additional count is decremented while freeing the skb, but struct
ubuf_info_msgzc still has a refcnt, so __msg_zerocopy_callback() is
not called.
The last refcnt is not released unless we retrieve the TX timestamped
skb by recvmsg(). Since we clear the error queue in inet_sock_destruct()
after the socket's refcnt reaches 0, there is a circular dependency.
If we close() the socket holding such skbs, we never call sock_put()
and leak the count, sk, and skb.
TCP has the same problem, and commit e0c8bccd40fc ("net: stream:
purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()") tried to fix it
by calling skb_queue_purge() during close(). However, there is a
small chance that skb queued in a qdisc or device could be put
into the error queue after the skb_queue_purge() call.
In __skb_tstamp_tx(), the cloned skb should not have a reference
to the ubuf to remove the circular dependency, but skb_clone() does
not call skb_copy_ubufs() for zerocopy skb. So, we need to call
skb_orphan_frags_rx() for the cloned skb to call skb_copy_ubufs().
[0]:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88800c6d2d00 (size 1152):
comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cd af e8 81 00 00 00 00 ................
02 00 07 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...@............
backtrace:
[<0000000055636812>] sk_prot_alloc+0x64/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2024
[<0000000054d77b7a>] sk_alloc+0x3b/0x800 net/core/sock.c:2083
[<0000000066f3c7e0>] inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:319 [inline]
[<0000000066f3c7e0>] inet_create+0x31e/0xe40 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:245
[<000000009b83af97>] __sock_create+0x2ab/0x550 net/socket.c:1515
[<00000000b9b11231>] sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket+0x138/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
[<000000004fb45142>] __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
[<000000004fb45142>] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
[<000000004fb45142>] __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
[<0000000066999e0e>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<0000000066999e0e>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<0000000017f238c1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888017633a00 (size 240):
comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2d 6d 0c 80 88 ff ff .........-m.....
backtrace:
[<000000002b1c4368>] __alloc_skb+0x229/0x320 net/core/skbuff.c:497
[<00000000143579a6>] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1265 [inline]
[<00000000143579a6>] sock_omalloc+0xaa/0x190 net/core/sock.c:2596
[<00000000be626478>] msg_zerocopy_alloc net/core/skbuff.c:1294 [inline]
[<00000000be626478>]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix possible panic during hotplug remove
During hotplug remove it is possible that the update counters work
might be pending, and may run after memory has been freed.
Cancel the update counters work before freeing memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the
/proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system
firmware update yields a BUG():
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2
Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c
CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0
[ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0
LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0
Call Trace:
usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0
__check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380
rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250
proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160
vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0
ksys_write+0x90/0x160
system_call_exception+0x178/0x320
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory
to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must
be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user
access.
[mpe: Trim and indent oops] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Enhance the attribute size check
This combines the overflow and boundary check so that all attribute size
will be properly examined while enumerating them.
[ 169.181521] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.183161] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880094b6240 by task mount/247
[ 169.184046]
[ 169.184925] CPU: 0 PID: 247 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7+ #3
[ 169.185908] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 169.187066] Call Trace:
[ 169.187492] <TASK>
[ 169.188049] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 169.188495] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 169.188964] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.189331] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 169.189714] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.190079] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60
[ 169.190634] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.191290] ? run_pack+0x840/0x840
[ 169.191569] ? run_lookup_entry+0xb3/0x1f0
[ 169.192443] ? mi_enum_attr+0x20a/0x230
[ 169.192886] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3e0
[ 169.193276] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570
[ 169.193557] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 169.193889] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 169.194236] ? mi_init+0x4a/0x70
[ 169.194496] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x166/0x1c0
[ 169.194851] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250
[ 169.195188] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0
[ 169.195481] ntfs_iget5+0x277/0x1780
[ 169.196017] ? call_rcu+0x1c7/0x330
[ 169.196392] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 169.196708] ? evict+0x223/0x280
[ 169.197014] ? __kmalloc+0x33/0x540
[ 169.197305] ? wnd_init+0x15b/0x1b0
[ 169.197599] ntfs_fill_super+0x1026/0x1ba0
[ 169.197994] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 169.198299] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 169.198583] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 169.198930] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 169.199269] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 169.199750] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 169.200094] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 169.200431] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 169.200714] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 169.201067] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.201358] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 169.201965] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.202445] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 169.203075] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.203414] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 169.203719] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 169.203977] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 169.204382] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 169.204711] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 169.205059] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 169.205571] RIP: 0033:0x7f67a80e948a
[ 169.206327] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 169.208296] RSP: 002b:00007ffddf020f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 169.209253] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e2547a6060 RCX: 00007f67a80e948a
[ 169.209777] RDX: 000055e2547a6260 RSI: 000055e2547a62e0 RDI: 000055e2547aeaf0
[ 169.210342] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055e2547a6280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 169.210843] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055e2547aeaf0
[ 169.211307] R13: 000055e2547a6260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 169.211913] </TASK>
[ 169.212304]
[ 169.212680] Allocated by task 0:
[ 169.212963] (stack is not available)
[ 169.213200]
[ 169.213472] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880094b5e00
[ 169.213472] which belongs to the cache UDP of size 1152
[ 169.214095] The buggy address is located 1088 bytes inside of
[ 169.214095] 1152-byte region [ffff8880094b5e00, ffff8880094b6280)
[ 169.214639]
[ 169.215004] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 169.215766] page:000000002e324c8c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x94b4
[ 169.218412] head:000000002e324c8c order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 169.219078] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 169.220272] raw: 000fffffc0010200
---truncated--- |
