| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet data by reading 2 bytes from the packet data. A buffer is then allocated to contain the entire packet, the size of which is calculated as the length of the packet body determined earlier and the header length. If the allocate fails because the specified packet is too large, no exception handling occurs and hciTrSerialRxIncoming continues to write bytes into the 4-byte large temporary header buffer, leading to a buffer overflow. This can be leveraged into an arbitrary write by an attacker. It is possible to overwrite the pointer to the buffer that is supposed to receive the contents of the packet body but which couldn't be allocated. One can then overwrite the state variable used by the function to determine which step of the parsing process is currently being executed. This advances the function to the next state, where it proceeds to copy data to that arbitrary location. The packet body is then written wherever the corrupted data pointer is pointing. |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet header by looking up the identifying first byte and matching it against a table of possible lengths. The initial parsing function, hciTrSerialRxIncoming does not drop packets with invalid identifiers but also does not set a safe default for the length of unknown packets' headers, leading to a buffer overflow. This can be leveraged into an arbitrary write by an attacker. It is possible to overwrite the pointer to a not-yet-allocated buffer that is supposed to receive the contents of the packet body. One can then overwrite the state variable used by the function to determine which state of packet parsing is currently occurring. Because the buffer is allocated when the last byte of the header has been copied, the combination of having a bad header length variable that will never match the counter variable and being able to overwrite the state variable with the resulting buffer overflow can be used to advance the function to the next step while skipping the buffer allocation and resulting pointer write. The next 16 bytes from the packet body are then written wherever the corrupted data pointer is pointing. |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet data by reading 2 bytes from the packet header. A buffer is then allocated to contain the entire packet, the size of which is calculated as the length of the packet body determined earlier plus the header length. WsfMsgAlloc then increments this again by sizeof(wsfMsg_t). This may cause an integer overflow that results in the buffer being significantly too small to contain the entire packet. This may cause a buffer overflow of up to 65 KB . This bug is trivial to exploit for a denial of service but can generally not be exploited further because the exploitable buffer is dynamically allocated. |
| An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. Its hci parsing software dynamically determines the length of certain hci packets by reading a byte from its header. This value is assumed to be greater than or equal to 3, but the software doesn't ensure that this is the case. Supplying a length less than 3 leads to a buffer overflow in a buffer that is allocated later. It is simultaneously possible to cause another integer overflow by supplying large length values because the provided length value is increased by a few bytes to account for additional information that is supposed to be stored there. This bug is trivial to exploit for a denial of service but is not certain to suffice to bring the system down and can generally not be exploited further because the exploitable buffer is dynamically allocated. |
| Mbed TLS 3.2.x through 3.4.x before 3.5 has a Buffer Overflow that can lead to remote Code execution. |
| Mbed TLS 2.x before 2.28.5 and 3.x before 3.5.0 has a Buffer Overflow. |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.28.1 and 3.x before 3.2.0. In some configurations, an unauthenticated attacker can send an invalid ClientHello message to a DTLS server that causes a heap-based buffer over-read of up to 255 bytes. This can cause a server crash or possibly information disclosure based on error responses. Affected configurations have MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE enabled and MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN less than a threshold that depends on the configuration: 258 bytes if using mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check, and possibly up to 571 bytes with a custom cookie check function. |
| In Mbed TLS before 3.1.0, psa_aead_generate_nonce allows policy bypass or oracle-based decryption when the output buffer is at memory locations accessible to an untrusted application. |
| In Mbed TLS before 2.28.0 and 3.x before 3.1.0, psa_cipher_generate_iv and psa_cipher_encrypt allow policy bypass or oracle-based decryption when the output buffer is at memory locations accessible to an untrusted application. |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.25.0 (and before 2.16.9 LTS and before 2.7.18 LTS). A NULL algorithm parameters entry looks identical to an array of REAL (size zero) and thus the certificate is considered valid. However, if the parameters do not match in any way, then the certificate should be considered invalid. |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.24.0. The verification of X.509 certificates when matching the expected common name (the cn argument of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify) with the actual certificate name is mishandled: when the subjecAltName extension is present, the expected name is compared to any name in that extension regardless of its type. This means that an attacker could impersonate a 4-byte or 16-byte domain by getting a certificate for the corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 address (this would require the attacker to control that IP address, though). |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.24.0 (and before 2.16.8 LTS and before 2.7.17 LTS). There is missing zeroization of plaintext buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read to erase unused application data from memory. |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.25.0 (and before 2.16.9 LTS and before 2.7.18 LTS). The calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod are not limited; thus, supplying overly large parameters could lead to denial of service when generating Diffie-Hellman key pairs. |
| An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.24.0. mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der has a buffer over-read (of one byte). |
| An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.24.0. It incorrectly uses a revocationDate check when deciding whether to honor certificate revocation via a CRL. In some situations, an attacker can exploit this by changing the local clock. |
| An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.24.0. An attacker can recover a private key (for RSA or static Diffie-Hellman) via a side-channel attack against generation of base blinding/unblinding values. |
| An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.23.0. A remote attacker can recover plaintext because a certain Lucky 13 countermeasure doesn't properly consider the case of a hardware accelerator. |
| An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.23.0. A side channel allows recovery of an ECC private key, related to mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv, mbedtls_pk_parse_key, mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile, mbedtls_ecp_mul, and mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable. |
| A Lucky 13 timing side channel in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf in library/ssl_msg.c in Trusted Firmware Mbed TLS through 2.23.0 allows an attacker to recover secret key information. This affects CBC mode because of a computed time difference based on a padding length. |
| Memory leaks were discovered in the CoAP library in Arm Mbed OS 5.15.3 when using the Arm mbed-coap library 5.1.5. The CoAP parser is responsible for parsing received CoAP packets. The function sn_coap_parser_options_parse() parses the CoAP option number field of all options present in the input packet. Each option number is calculated as a sum of the previous option number and a delta of the current option. The delta and the previous option number are expressed as unsigned 16-bit integers. Due to lack of overflow detection, it is possible to craft a packet that wraps the option number around and results in the same option number being processed again in a single packet. Certain options allocate memory by calling a memory allocation function. In the cases of COAP_OPTION_URI_QUERY, COAP_OPTION_URI_PATH, COAP_OPTION_LOCATION_QUERY, and COAP_OPTION_ETAG, there is no check on whether memory has already been allocated, which in conjunction with the option number integer overflow may lead to multiple assignments of allocated memory to a single pointer. This has been demonstrated to lead to memory leak by buffer orphaning. As a result, the memory is never freed. |
