Privilege escalation via JFrog Worker event token exposure

An event-handling weakness in JFrog Artifactory could expose privileged authorization material to a lower-privileged user under specific conditions.

HCL Aftermarket EPC is vulnerable to attack since the application does not have an appropriate caching policy specifying the extent to which the page and its form fields should be cached. If sensitive information in application responses is stored in the local cache, then this may be retrieved by other users who have access to the same computer at a future time.

Authentication Bypass in Webhook Endpoints Allowed Unauthorized Flow Execution

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 has a vulnerability in Langflow's webhook authentication logic allows unauthenticated users to trigger the execution of any flow. The system incorrectly bypasses API key validation when the WEBHOOK_AUTH_ENABLE configuration is set to False (which is the default setting). This allows a remote attacker who knows a flow's UUID to execute it as if they were the owner, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Netty: Denial of Service via Unbounded Headers in StompSubframeDecoder

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeDecoder fails to limit the total number of headers or their cumulative size per frame, and the maxLineLength parameter only restricts individual header lines. An attacker can send a large number of short headers that are accumulated in memory inside DefaultStompHeadersSubframe until the JVM throws an OutOfMemoryError, causing denial of service for servers exposing a STOMP endpoint based on StompSubframeDecoder. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

Azure AI Search Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Search allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

HCL IEM was affected with the Information disclosure nginx server

HCL IEM was affected with the Information disclosure nginx server. It may enable attackers to identify outdated software versions and target known vulnerabilities or publicly available exploits.

HCL IEM was affected with Strict transport security not enforced

HCL IEM was affected with Strict transport security not enforced. It may enable attackers to perform SSL stripping or man-in-the-middle attacks and compromise secure communications.

HCL IEM was affected with the Anti Clickjacking XFrame Options Header Missing

HCL IEM was affected with the Anti Clickjacking XFrame Options Header Missing. It may allow attackers to embed the application in malicious pages and induce unauthorized user actions.

HCL IEM was affected with X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing

HCL IEM was affected with X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing. It may enable attackers to perform SSL stripping or man-in-the-middle attacks and intercept sensitive data.

PraisonAI Platform workspace-scoped routes allow cross-workspace object access by global object ID

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID. The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the `workspace_id` provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL. As a result, a valid member of `workspace_attacker` can call a route under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...` while supplying an object UUID from `workspace_victim`. The server authorizes the request based on membership in `workspace_attacker`, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID. This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

PraisonAI Platform missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and take over workspace membership

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role="member"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members' roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Dependency endpoints accept any issue_id and dep_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace issue linking + read + delete IDOR

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints (`POST/GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies` and `DELETE .../dependencies/{dep_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then dispatch to `DependencyService` calls that take URL/body-supplied issue and dependency IDs without verifying any of them belong to the membership-checked workspace. Most damaging: `create_dependency` accepts `body.depends_on_issue_id` from the request body — that ID is checked against nothing — letting an attacker create a "blocks" or "related" link between any two issues anywhere in the database. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

PraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can remove any other member (including the owner) via DELETE /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: JWT signing key defaults to hardcoded "dev-secret-change-me", allowing token forgery for any user when PLATFORM_ENV is unset

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`) and forwards the request body's `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

praisonai-platform: Label endpoints accept any label_id and any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace label edit/delete and issue-label-link IDOR

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../labels/{label_id}`, `POST .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `GET .../issues/{issue_id}/labels` — gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only and pass URL-supplied `label_id` and `issue_id` straight through to `LabelService` without verifying either belongs to the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.