| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: bla: avoid double decrement of bla.num_requests
The bla.num_requests is increased when no request_sent was in progress. And
it is decremented in various places (announcement was received, backbone is
purged, periodic work). But the check if the request_sent is actually set
to a specific state and the atomic_dec/_inc are not safe because they are
not atomic (TOCTOU) and multiple such code portions can run concurrently.
At the same time, it is necessary to modify request_sent (state) and
bla.num_requests atomically. Otherwise batadv_bla_send_request() might set
request_sent to 1 and is interrupted. batadv_handle_announce() can then
set request_sent back to 0 and decrement num_requests before
batadv_bla_send_request() incremented it.
The two operations must therefore be locked. And since state (request_sent)
and wait_periods are only accessed inside this lock, they can be converted
to simpler datatypes. And to avoid that the bla.num_requests is touched by
a parallel running context with a valid backbone_gw reference after
batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw() ran, a third state "stopped" is required to
correctly signal that a backbone_gw is in the state of being cleaned up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: directly shut down timer on cleanup
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup() was calling timer_delete_sync() followed by
timer_delete() to guard against the timer handler re-arming itself between
the two calls. This double-deletion hack relied on the sending status being
set to 0 to suppress re-arming.
Replace both calls with a single timer_shutdown_sync(). This function both
waits for any running timer callback to complete (like timer_delete_sync())
and permanently disarms the timer so it cannot be re-armed afterwards,
making re-arming prevention unconditional and self-documenting.
The re-arming property is also required because otherwise:
1. context 0 (batadv_tp_recv_ack()) checks in
batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() if sending is still 1 -> it is
2. context 1 changes in batadv_tp_sender_shutdown() sending to 0 and in
this process forces the kthread to stop timer in
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup()
3. context 0 continues in batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() and rearms the
timer -> but the reference for it is already gone |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix TOCTOU race for reported vlans
The local TT based TVLV is generated by first checking the number of VLANs
which have at least one TT entry. A new buffer with the correct size for
the VLANs is then allocated. Only then, the list of VLANs s used to fill
the VLAN entries in the buffer. During this time, the meshif_vlan_list_lock
is held. But the actual number of TT entries of each VLAN can still
increase during this time - just not the number of VLANs in the list.
But the prefilter used in the buffer size calculation might still cause an
increase of the number of VLANs which need to be stored. Simply because a
VLAN might now suddenly have at least one entry when it had none in the
pre-alloc check - and then needs to occupy space which was not allocated.
It is better to overestimate the buffer size at the beginning and then fill
the buffer only with the VLANs which are not empty. |
| A time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in fastschema through v0.15.1 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass the OTP attempt limit on the account recovery flow, enabling brute-force attacks on 6-digit OTP codes. |
| The ACAP framework contains a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, which could potentially lead to privilege escalation. This vulnerability can only be exploited if the Axis device is configured to allow the installation of unsigned ACAP applications, and if an attacker convinces the victim to install a malicious ACAP application. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use race condition in the BIOS firmware for some Intel(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watchdog: airoha: Prevent division by zero when clock frequency is zero
clk_get_rate() can return 0 when the clock provider is not properly
configured or the clock is unmanaged. The driver uses wdt_freq as a
divisor directly in airoha_wdt_probe() to compute max_timeout and in
airoha_wdt_get_timeleft() to compute the remaining time, which results
in a division by zero.
Add a check for wdt_freq == 0 in probe and return -EINVAL with
dev_err_probe() to prevent the division by zero and provide a
diagnostic message. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: convert pmsr_free_wk to wiphy_work to fix deadlock
When a netlink socket that owns a PMSR session is closed,
cfg80211_release_pmsr() clears the request's nl_portid and queues
pmsr_free_wk to call cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() asynchronously.
If the interface tears down concurrently, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down()
is called under wiphy_lock and calls cancel_work_sync(&pmsr_free_wk)
to wait for any running work. The work function acquires wiphy_lock
via guard(wiphy) before calling process_abort.
This is a deadlock: wdev_down holds wiphy_lock and blocks inside
cancel_work_sync(); pmsr_free_wk blocks trying to acquire that same
wiphy_lock. Neither thread can proceed.
The same deadlock is reachable from cfg80211_leave_locked(), which
calls cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() for all interface types under
wiphy_lock.
Fix this by converting pmsr_free_wk from a plain work_struct to a
wiphy_work. The wiphy_work dispatcher holds wiphy_lock when running
work items, so the explicit guard(wiphy) in the work function is no
longer needed. wiphy_work_cancel() can be called safely while holding
wiphy_lock - since wiphy_lock prevents the work from running
concurrently, wiphy_work_cancel() never blocks, eliminating the
deadlock.
Remove the cancel_work_sync() for pmsr_free_wk from the
NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler. cfg80211_leave(), called unconditionally
just before it, already cancels any pending work under wiphy_lock
via wiphy_work_cancel() inside cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: wake eh reliably when using scsi_schedule_eh
Drivers which use the scsi_schedule_eh function to run the error handler
currently risk the error handler thread never waking once all commands are
timed out or inactive. There is no enforced memory order between setting
the host into error recovery state and counting busy commands. This can
result in a race with scsi_dec_host_busy where neither CPU sees both
conditions of all commands inactive and the host error state to request
waking the error handler.
To fix this, run the scsi_schedule_eh's scsi_eh_wakeup from a new work item
which will use rcu to ensure scsi_schedule_eh's call to scsi_host_busy will
occur after the error state is globally visible and will be seen by any
current scsi_dec_host_busy callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rtl2832: fix use-after-free in rtl2832_remove()
cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called before i2c_mux_del_adapters()
in rtl2832_remove(). While the cancel waits for any running instance
of i2c_gate_work to finish, it does not prevent the timer from being
rescheduled by a concurrent thread.
During probe, the r820t_attach() call attempts I2C transfers through
the mux adapter. These transfers go through i2c_mux_master_xfer(),
which calls rtl2832_deselect() after the transfer completes,
rescheduling i2c_gate_work via schedule_delayed_work(). If this
transfer is still in flight when rtl2832_remove() runs,
rtl2832_deselect() can reschedule i2c_gate_work after it has been
cancelled, causing a use-after-free when kfree(dev) is called.
Fix this by calling i2c_mux_del_adapters() before
cancel_delayed_work_sync(). Once the mux adapter is unregistered, no
new I2C transfers can go through it, so rtl2832_deselect() can no
longer reschedule i2c_gate_work. The subsequent
cancel_delayed_work_sync() is then guaranteed to be final. |
| A denial-of-service
vulnerability exists in httpd service on Archer A6 v4 where the asynchronous systool
instruction handlng path in httpd does not properly synchronize or safely manage
concurrent systool operations.
By sending
crafted systool instructions through the asynchronous request path, successful
exploitation may cause the httpd process or device management service to crash
and may result in temporary loss of access to the web management interface or
device reboot. |
| Windows Kernel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability |
| Windows AppX Deployment Extensions Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Preserve rq tracking across local DSQ dispatch
dispatch_to_local_dsq() can run from scx_bpf_dsq_move_to_local() while
ops.dispatch() has recorded the current rq. Moving a task to a local DSQ
may switch to the source or destination rq before synchronously invoking
ops.dequeue() through the following path:
SCX_CALL_OP(dispatch, rq)
ops.dispatch()
scx_bpf_dsq_move_to_local()
scx_flush_dispatch_buf()
finish_dispatch()
dispatch_to_local_dsq()
scx_dispatch_enqueue()
local_dsq_post_enq()
call_task_dequeue()
SCX_CALL_OP_TASK(dequeue, locked_rq, ...)
The nested callback saves the recorded rq and restores it on return. If
the rq tracking does not follow the lock switch, update_locked_rq() can
trigger the following lockdep assertion while restoring an rq which is
no longer held:
WARNING: kernel/sched/sched.h:1641 at call_task_dequeue+0x160/0x170
Call Trace:
scx_dispatch_enqueue+0x2b0/0x460
dispatch_to_local_dsq+0x138/0x230
scx_flush_dispatch_buf+0x1af/0x220
scx_bpf_dsq_move_to_local___v2+0xe2/0x1c0
bpf__sched_ext_ops_dispatch+0x4b/0xa7
do_pick_task_scx+0x3b6/0x910
__pick_next_task+0x105/0x1f0
__schedule+0x3e7/0x1980
Introduce switch_rq_lock() to update the tracking state together with
each rq lock handoff. Use it in dispatch_to_local_dsq(),
move_remote_task_to_local_dsq() and the in-balance paths of
scx_dsq_move(), ensuring that scx_locked_rq() consistently refers to the
rq whose lock is actually held throughout the lock dance. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion
This fixes this race:
- thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe ->
fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref
yet
- thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() ->
fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0
- thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of
fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes
- thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs
and calls
"wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);"
The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as
nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring,
queue, and ent are leaked.
Fix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created
ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the
scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref
and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already
waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or
if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the
async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents
and decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the
eventual queue and ring teardown. |
| Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0. |
| Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. |
