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Search Results (2 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-92288 1 Lemonldap-ng 1 Portal 2026-09-28 9.1 Critical
Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.20.0 before 2.21.6, from 2.22.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow unauthenticated OAuth2 token introspection because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret of a public Relying Party. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the authentication method deduced from the request, client_secret_basic or client_secret_post. introspection() rejects a caller only when that method is missing or none, so a request carrying a public client_id and an arbitrary or empty secret passes the endpoint's authentication check. An attacker who holds an access token and knows the client_id of any public Relying Party can confirm the token is active and read its metadata, including scope, audience, expiry and the sub claim. The sub claim is computed with the calling Relying Party's user identifier attribute, so an attacker can translate a user identifier from one Relying Party to another, defeating per-client and pseudonymous identifiers.
CVE-2026-92289 1 Lemonldap-ng 1 Portal 2026-09-28 9.1 Critical
Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret. With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present. An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.