The DNP3 feature on Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 1766-Lxxxxx A FRN controllers 7 and earlier and 1400 1766-Lxxxxx B FRN controllers before 15.001 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process disruption) via malformed packets over (1) an Ethernet network or (2) a serial line.
Advisories
Source ID Title
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2014-5298 The DNP3 feature on Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 1766-Lxxxxx A FRN controllers 7 and earlier and 1400 1766-Lxxxxx B FRN controllers before 15.001 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process disruption) via malformed packets over (1) an Ethernet network or (2) a serial line.
Fixes

Solution

Rockwell Automation has released a new version of MicroLogix 1400 Series B firmware to address the vulnerability and reduce associated risk to successful exploitation. Subsequent versions of MicroLogix 1400 Series B firmware and newer will incorporate these same enhancements. Rockwell Automation recommends the following immediate mitigation strategies (when possible, multiple strategies should be employed simultaneously): * Upgrade all MicroLogix 1400 Series B controllers to Series B FRN 15.001 or higher. Current firmware for the MicroLogix 1400 Series B platform can be obtained at the following web address: http://www.rockwellautomation.com/rockwellautomation/support/pcdc.page Please refer to Rockwell Automation’s product disclosure (AID 620295) for more information on this topic available at: https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/620295


Workaround

Users with Series A and Series B controllers are also recommended to apply the following risk mitigations: * Do not enable DNP3 communication in the product unless required. * Where appropriate, prohibit DNP3 communication that originates outside the perimeter of the manufacturing zone from entry into the zone by blocking communication directed at Ethernet communication Port 20000/TCP* and 20000/UDP* using appropriate security technology (e.g., a firewall, UTM devices, or other security appliance)           *Note: Ports 20000/TCP and 20000/UDP are factory defaults as per the DNP3 specification but can be reconfigured by the product owner. * Employ firewalls with ingress/egress filtering, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and validate all configurations. Evaluate firewall configurations to ensure other appropriate inbound and outbound traffic is blocked. * Restrict physical and electronic access to automation products, networks, and systems to only those individuals authorized to be in contact with control system equipment. * Employ layered security, defense-in-depth methods and network segregation and segmentation practices in system design to restrict and control access to individual products and control networks. Refer to http://www.ab.com/networks/architectures.html http://www.ab.com/networks/architectures.html%20  for comprehensive information about implementing validated architectures designed to deliver these measures. Please refer to Rockwell Automation’s product disclosure (AID 620295) for more information on this topic available at: https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/620295

History

Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:45:00 +0000


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: icscert

Published:

Updated: 2025-11-04T22:30:19.113Z

Reserved: 2014-08-22T00:00:00

Link: CVE-2014-5410

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2014-10-03T18:55:06.077

Modified: 2025-11-04T23:15:33.003

Link: CVE-2014-5410

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.