{"containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"product": "radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server", "vendor": "RadarCOVID", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "iOS version < 1.0.8"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "Android version < 1.0.7"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "Backend < 1.1.2-RELEASE"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Radar COVID is the official COVID-19 exposure notification app for Spain. In affected versions of Radar COVID, identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users that upload Radar COVID TEKs to the Radar COVID server is possible. This vulnerability enables the identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users when using Radar COVID. The vulnerability is caused by the fact that Radar COVID connections to the server (uploading of TEKs to the backend) are only made by COVID-19 positives. Therefore, any on-path observer with the ability to monitor traffic between the app and the server can identify which users had a positive test. Such an adversary can be the mobile network operator (MNO) if the connection is done through a mobile network, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) if the connection is done through the Internet (e.g., a home network), a VPN provider used by the user, the local network operator in the case of enterprise networks, or any eavesdropper with access to the same network (WiFi or Ethernet) as the user as could be the case of public WiFi hotspots deployed at shopping centers, airports, hotels, and coffee shops. The attacker may also de-anonymize the user. For this additional stage to succeed, the adversary needs to correlate Radar COVID traffic to other identifiable information from the victim. This could be achieved by associating the connection to a contract with the name of the victim or by associating Radar COVID traffic to other user-generated flows containing identifiers in the clear (e.g., HTTP cookies or other mobile flows sending unique identifiers like the IMEI or the AAID without encryption). The former can be executed, for instance, by the Internet Service Provider or the MNO. The latter can be executed by any on-path adversary, such as the network provider or even the cloud provider that hosts more than one service accessed by the victim. The farther the adversary is either from the victim (the client) or the end-point (the server), the less likely it may be that the adversary has access to re-identification information. The vulnerability has been mitigated with the injection of dummy traffic from the application to the backend. Dummy traffic is generated by all users independently of whether they are COVID-19 positive or not. The issue was fixed in iOS in version 1.0.8 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Android in version 1.0.7 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Backend in version 1.1.2-RELEASE. For more information see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory."}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-200", "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"dateUpdated": "2020-11-13T18:30:27", "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M"}, "references": [{"tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/09d00e5ede801ca400d45c7feda5a99c34e4176c"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/53252773ffa81e116deabcbbea3bac96872b9888"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/7fdc7debeb8a37faa77b53d9f9a1b4bbcff445ce"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/8e5d14ec60e0c1847a4733556cf34d232c27102c"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/91dcfff6252055637bc9ee0c46b8f003d64a16b9"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/9627f4d69705bca68e550eefd3df1b9abe90b215"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/ea0c4cc837f72f58e2b5df1ecf0899743ec3cdf8"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/6d30c92cc8fcbde3ded7e9518853ef278080344d"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/c37f81636250892670750e3989139fd76d4beffe"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ios/commit/2d1505d4858642995ea09f02f23c953acaa65195"}, {"tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Best%20Practices%20for%20Operation%20Security%20in%20Proximity%20Tracing.pdf"}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "title": "Deanonymization of COVID-19 positive users of Radar COVID", "x_legacyV4Record": {"CVE_data_meta": {"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2020-26230", "STATE": "PUBLIC", "TITLE": "Deanonymization of COVID-19 positive users of Radar COVID"}, "affects": {"vendor": {"vendor_data": [{"product": {"product_data": [{"product_name": "radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server", "version": {"version_data": [{"version_value": "iOS version < 1.0.8"}, {"version_value": "Android version < 1.0.7"}, {"version_value": "Backend < 1.1.2-RELEASE"}]}}]}, "vendor_name": "RadarCOVID"}]}}, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": {"description_data": [{"lang": "eng", "value": "Radar COVID is the official COVID-19 exposure notification app for Spain. In affected versions of Radar COVID, identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users that upload Radar COVID TEKs to the Radar COVID server is possible. This vulnerability enables the identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users when using Radar COVID. The vulnerability is caused by the fact that Radar COVID connections to the server (uploading of TEKs to the backend) are only made by COVID-19 positives. Therefore, any on-path observer with the ability to monitor traffic between the app and the server can identify which users had a positive test. Such an adversary can be the mobile network operator (MNO) if the connection is done through a mobile network, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) if the connection is done through the Internet (e.g., a home network), a VPN provider used by the user, the local network operator in the case of enterprise networks, or any eavesdropper with access to the same network (WiFi or Ethernet) as the user as could be the case of public WiFi hotspots deployed at shopping centers, airports, hotels, and coffee shops. The attacker may also de-anonymize the user. For this additional stage to succeed, the adversary needs to correlate Radar COVID traffic to other identifiable information from the victim. This could be achieved by associating the connection to a contract with the name of the victim or by associating Radar COVID traffic to other user-generated flows containing identifiers in the clear (e.g., HTTP cookies or other mobile flows sending unique identifiers like the IMEI or the AAID without encryption). The former can be executed, for instance, by the Internet Service Provider or the MNO. The latter can be executed by any on-path adversary, such as the network provider or even the cloud provider that hosts more than one service accessed by the victim. The farther the adversary is either from the victim (the client) or the end-point (the server), the less likely it may be that the adversary has access to re-identification information. The vulnerability has been mitigated with the injection of dummy traffic from the application to the backend. Dummy traffic is generated by all users independently of whether they are COVID-19 positive or not. The issue was fixed in iOS in version 1.0.8 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Android in version 1.0.7 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Backend in version 1.1.2-RELEASE. For more information see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory."}]}, "impact": {"cvss": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}, "problemtype": {"problemtype_data": [{"description": [{"lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor"}]}]}, "references": {"reference_data": [{"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/09d00e5ede801ca400d45c7feda5a99c34e4176c", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/09d00e5ede801ca400d45c7feda5a99c34e4176c"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/53252773ffa81e116deabcbbea3bac96872b9888", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/53252773ffa81e116deabcbbea3bac96872b9888"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/7fdc7debeb8a37faa77b53d9f9a1b4bbcff445ce", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/7fdc7debeb8a37faa77b53d9f9a1b4bbcff445ce"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/8e5d14ec60e0c1847a4733556cf34d232c27102c", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/8e5d14ec60e0c1847a4733556cf34d232c27102c"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/91dcfff6252055637bc9ee0c46b8f003d64a16b9", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/91dcfff6252055637bc9ee0c46b8f003d64a16b9"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/9627f4d69705bca68e550eefd3df1b9abe90b215", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/9627f4d69705bca68e550eefd3df1b9abe90b215"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/ea0c4cc837f72f58e2b5df1ecf0899743ec3cdf8", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/ea0c4cc837f72f58e2b5df1ecf0899743ec3cdf8"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/6d30c92cc8fcbde3ded7e9518853ef278080344d", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/6d30c92cc8fcbde3ded7e9518853ef278080344d"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/c37f81636250892670750e3989139fd76d4beffe", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/c37f81636250892670750e3989139fd76d4beffe"}, {"name": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ios/commit/2d1505d4858642995ea09f02f23c953acaa65195", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ios/commit/2d1505d4858642995ea09f02f23c953acaa65195"}, {"name": "https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Best%20Practices%20for%20Operation%20Security%20in%20Proximity%20Tracing.pdf", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Best%20Practices%20for%20Operation%20Security%20in%20Proximity%20Tracing.pdf"}]}, "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}, "adp": [{"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "shortName": "CVE", "dateUpdated": "2024-08-04T15:56:03.112Z"}, "title": "CVE Program Container", "references": [{"tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM", "x_transferred"], "url": 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{}

{"configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "65DAC605-1A83-4D87-B736-4DF1DBF809BE", "versionEndExcluding": "1.1.2", "vulnerable": true}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radarcovid:*:*:uniform_distribution:*:*:android:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "06C3E370-48DE-4D0D-AC0C-2BBFD0231AF2", "versionEndExcluding": "1.0.7", "vulnerable": true}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radarcovid:*:*:uniform_distribution:*:*:iphone_os:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "79AEB4D0-2FE6-4ADE-821C-0CD0B32D0454", "versionEndExcluding": "1.0.8", "vulnerable": true}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radarcovid:*:*:exponential_distribution:*:*:android:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "69C24073-7F73-4F3E-8BED-452BEFC10EE0", "versionEndExcluding": "1.1.0", "vulnerable": true}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radarcovid:*:*:exponential_distribution:*:*:iphone_os:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "8FD3C0F0-069D-43B8-917C-70707AE60D8D", "versionEndExcluding": "1.1.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Radar COVID is the official COVID-19 exposure notification app for Spain. In affected versions of Radar COVID, identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users that upload Radar COVID TEKs to the Radar COVID server is possible. This vulnerability enables the identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users when using Radar COVID. The vulnerability is caused by the fact that Radar COVID connections to the server (uploading of TEKs to the backend) are only made by COVID-19 positives. Therefore, any on-path observer with the ability to monitor traffic between the app and the server can identify which users had a positive test. Such an adversary can be the mobile network operator (MNO) if the connection is done through a mobile network, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) if the connection is done through the Internet (e.g., a home network), a VPN provider used by the user, the local network operator in the case of enterprise networks, or any eavesdropper with access to the same network (WiFi or Ethernet) as the user as could be the case of public WiFi hotspots deployed at shopping centers, airports, hotels, and coffee shops. The attacker may also de-anonymize the user. For this additional stage to succeed, the adversary needs to correlate Radar COVID traffic to other identifiable information from the victim. This could be achieved by associating the connection to a contract with the name of the victim or by associating Radar COVID traffic to other user-generated flows containing identifiers in the clear (e.g., HTTP cookies or other mobile flows sending unique identifiers like the IMEI or the AAID without encryption). The former can be executed, for instance, by the Internet Service Provider or the MNO. The latter can be executed by any on-path adversary, such as the network provider or even the cloud provider that hosts more than one service accessed by the victim. The farther the adversary is either from the victim (the client) or the end-point (the server), the less likely it may be that the adversary has access to re-identification information. The vulnerability has been mitigated with the injection of dummy traffic from the application to the backend. Dummy traffic is generated by all users independently of whether they are COVID-19 positive or not. The issue was fixed in iOS in version 1.0.8 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Android in version 1.0.7 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Backend in version 1.1.2-RELEASE. For more information see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Radar COVID es la aplicaci\u00f3n oficial de notificaci\u00f3n de exposici\u00f3n COVID-19 para Espa\u00f1a.&#xa0;En las versiones afectadas de Radar COVID, es posible la identificaci\u00f3n y desanonimizaci\u00f3n de los usuarios positivos de COVID-19 que cargan Radar COVID TEK en el servidor de Radar COVID.&#xa0;Esta vulnerabilidad permite la identificaci\u00f3n y desanonimizaci\u00f3n de los usuarios positivos de COVID-19 cuando se usa Radar COVID.&#xa0;La vulnerabilidad es causada mediante el hecho de que las conexiones de COVID de radar al servidor (cargando desde TEK hacia el backend) solo las realizan los positivos de COVID-19.&#xa0;Por lo tanto, cualquier observador sobre la ruta con la capacidad de monitorear el tr\u00e1fico entre la aplicaci\u00f3n y el servidor puede identificar qu\u00e9 usuarios tuvieron una prueba positiva.&#xa0;Tal adversario puede ser el operador de red m\u00f3vil (MNO) si la conexi\u00f3n se realiza por medio de una red m\u00f3vil, el Proveedor de Servicios de Internet (ISP) si la conexi\u00f3n se realiza por medio de Internet (por ejemplo,&#xa0;una red dom\u00e9stica), un proveedor de VPN usado por el usuario, el operador de red local en el caso de redes empresariales, o cualquier esp\u00eda con acceso a la misma red (WiFi o Ethernet) que el usuario como podr\u00eda ser el caso de puntos de acceso WiFi p\u00fablicos desplegados en centros comerciales, aeropuertos, hoteles y cafeter\u00edas.&#xa0;El atacante tambi\u00e9n puede anonimizar al usuario.&#xa0;Para que esta etapa adicional tenga \u00e9xito, el adversario necesita correlacionar el tr\u00e1fico de Radar COVID con otra informaci\u00f3n identificable de la v\u00edctima.&#xa0;Esto podr\u00eda ser logrado asociando la conexi\u00f3n a un contrato con el nombre de la v\u00edctima o al asociar el tr\u00e1fico de Radar COVID a otros flujos generados por el usuario que contengan identificadores en claro (por ejemplo, cookies HTTP u otros flujos m\u00f3viles que env\u00edan identificadores \u00fanicos como IMEI o el AAID sin cifrar).&#xa0;El primero puede ser ejecutado, por ejemplo,&#xa0;por el Proveedor de Servicios de Internet o el MNO.&#xa0;Este \u00faltimo puede ser ejecutado por cualquier adversario sobre la ruta, como el proveedor de red o incluso el proveedor de nube que aloja m\u00e1s de un servicio al que accede la v\u00edctima.&#xa0;Cuanto m\u00e1s lejos est\u00e9 el adversario de la v\u00edctima (el cliente) o del endpoint (el servidor), es menos probable que el adversario tenga acceso a la informaci\u00f3n de reidentificaci\u00f3n.&#xa0;La vulnerabilidad ha sido mitigada con la inyecci\u00f3n de tr\u00e1fico ficticio desde la aplicaci\u00f3n hacia el backend.&#xa0;Todos los usuarios generan tr\u00e1fico ficticio independientemente de si son positivos para COVID-19 o no.&#xa0;El problema se corrigi\u00f3 en iOS en versi\u00f3n 1.0.8 (distribuci\u00f3n uniforme), versi\u00f3n 1.1.0 (distribuci\u00f3n exponencial), Android en versi\u00f3n 1.0.7 (distribuci\u00f3n uniforme), versi\u00f3n 1.1.0 (distribuci\u00f3n exponencial), Backend en versi\u00f3n 1.1.2- RELEASE. Para m\u00e1s informaci\u00f3n consulte el GitHub Security Advisory referenciado"}], "id": "CVE-2020-26230", "lastModified": "2021-02-04T15:42:33.293", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV2": [{"acInsufInfo": false, "baseSeverity": "LOW", "cvssData": {"accessComplexity": "HIGH", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 2.6, "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N", "version": "2.0"}, "exploitabilityScore": 4.9, "impactScore": 2.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary", "userInteractionRequired": true}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 1.6, "impactScore": 3.6, "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary"}, {"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.4, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 4.0, "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2020-11-13T19:15:12.000", "references": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Exploit", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Best%20Practices%20for%20Operation%20Security%20in%20Proximity%20Tracing.pdf"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/09d00e5ede801ca400d45c7feda5a99c34e4176c"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/53252773ffa81e116deabcbbea3bac96872b9888"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/7fdc7debeb8a37faa77b53d9f9a1b4bbcff445ce"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/8e5d14ec60e0c1847a4733556cf34d232c27102c"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/91dcfff6252055637bc9ee0c46b8f003d64a16b9"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/9627f4d69705bca68e550eefd3df1b9abe90b215"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/ea0c4cc837f72f58e2b5df1ecf0899743ec3cdf8"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/6d30c92cc8fcbde3ded7e9518853ef278080344d"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/c37f81636250892670750e3989139fd76d4beffe"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ios/commit/2d1505d4858642995ea09f02f23c953acaa65195"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-200"}], "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Primary"}]}

{}