A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
application data sent over that connection.
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
application data sent over that connection.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-3325-1 | openssl security update |
Debian DSA |
DSA-5343-1 | openssl security update |
EUVD |
EUVD-2023-0751 | A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. |
Github GHSA |
GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4 | openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-5844-1 | OpenSSL vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6564-1 | Node.js vulnerabilities |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Tue, 04 Nov 2025 20:30:00 +0000
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|---|---|---|
| References |
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Thu, 20 Mar 2025 21:15:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Thu, 13 Feb 2025 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. | A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. |
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: openssl
Published:
Updated: 2025-11-04T19:14:12.161Z
Reserved: 2022-12-06T10:38:40.463Z
Link: CVE-2022-4304
Updated: 2025-11-04T19:14:12.161Z
Status : Modified
Published: 2023-02-08T20:15:23.887
Modified: 2025-11-04T20:16:14.897
Link: CVE-2022-4304
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Debian DLA
Debian DSA
EUVD
Github GHSA
Ubuntu USN