In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tty: vt: initialize unicode screen buffer

syzbot reports kernel infoleak at vcs_read() [1], for buffer can be read
immediately after resize operation. Initialize buffer using kzalloc().

----------
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/fb.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct fb_var_screeninfo var = { };
const int fb_fd = open("/dev/fb0", 3);
ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOGET_VSCREENINFO, &var);
var.yres = 0x21;
ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, &var);
return read(open("/dev/vcsu", O_RDONLY), &var, sizeof(var)) == -1;
}
----------
Advisories
Source ID Title
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2022-55217 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: vt: initialize unicode screen buffer syzbot reports kernel infoleak at vcs_read() [1], for buffer can be read immediately after resize operation. Initialize buffer using kzalloc(). ---------- #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/fb.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct fb_var_screeninfo var = { }; const int fb_fd = open("/dev/fb0", 3); ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOGET_VSCREENINFO, &var); var.yres = 0x21; ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, &var); return read(open("/dev/vcsu", O_RDONLY), &var, sizeof(var)) == -1; } ----------
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses NVD-CWE-noinfo
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Thu, 19 Jun 2025 15:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Wed, 18 Jun 2025 11:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: vt: initialize unicode screen buffer syzbot reports kernel infoleak at vcs_read() [1], for buffer can be read immediately after resize operation. Initialize buffer using kzalloc(). ---------- #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/fb.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct fb_var_screeninfo var = { }; const int fb_fd = open("/dev/fb0", 3); ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOGET_VSCREENINFO, &var); var.yres = 0x21; ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, &var); return read(open("/dev/vcsu", O_RDONLY), &var, sizeof(var)) == -1; } ----------
Title tty: vt: initialize unicode screen buffer
References

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2025-09-03T12:59:06.426Z

Reserved: 2025-06-18T10:57:27.430Z

Link: CVE-2022-50222

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2025-06-18T11:15:53.193

Modified: 2025-11-19T12:58:50.870

Link: CVE-2022-50222

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2025-06-18T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2022-50222 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2025-06-23T08:36:34Z

Weaknesses