In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust
If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.
However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().
These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)
Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.
Also improve some comments.
blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust
If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.
However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().
These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)
Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.
Also improve some comments.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
No data.
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Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Sat, 04 Oct 2025 15:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures. However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value of blk_crypto_evict_key(). These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just talking about what happens if they do anyway.) Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the keyslot management structures even on failure. Also improve some comments. | |
| Title | blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust | |
| References |
|
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-10-04T15:16:47.304Z
Reserved: 2025-10-04T15:14:15.919Z
Link: CVE-2023-53536
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2025-10-04T16:15:48.580
Modified: 2025-10-04T16:15:48.580
Link: CVE-2023-53536
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.