In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

posix-timers: Ensure timer ID search-loop limit is valid

posix_timer_add() tries to allocate a posix timer ID by starting from the
cached ID which was stored by the last successful allocation.

This is done in a loop searching the ID space for a free slot one by
one. The loop has to terminate when the search wrapped around to the
starting point.

But that's racy vs. establishing the starting point. That is read out
lockless, which leads to the following problem:

CPU0 CPU1
posix_timer_add()
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
lock(hash_lock);
... posix_timer_add()
if (++sig->posix_timer_id < 0)
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
sig->posix_timer_id = 0;

So CPU1 can observe a negative start value, i.e. -1, and the loop break
never happens because the condition can never be true:

if (sig->posix_timer_id == start)
break;

While this is unlikely to ever turn into an endless loop as the ID space is
huge (INT_MAX), the racy read of the start value caught the attention of
KCSAN and Dmitry unearthed that incorrectness.

Rewrite it so that all id operations are under the hash lock.
Advisories

No advisories yet.

Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Thu, 23 Oct 2025 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Low


Wed, 22 Oct 2025 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-timers: Ensure timer ID search-loop limit is valid posix_timer_add() tries to allocate a posix timer ID by starting from the cached ID which was stored by the last successful allocation. This is done in a loop searching the ID space for a free slot one by one. The loop has to terminate when the search wrapped around to the starting point. But that's racy vs. establishing the starting point. That is read out lockless, which leads to the following problem: CPU0 CPU1 posix_timer_add() start = sig->posix_timer_id; lock(hash_lock); ... posix_timer_add() if (++sig->posix_timer_id < 0) start = sig->posix_timer_id; sig->posix_timer_id = 0; So CPU1 can observe a negative start value, i.e. -1, and the loop break never happens because the condition can never be true: if (sig->posix_timer_id == start) break; While this is unlikely to ever turn into an endless loop as the ID space is huge (INT_MAX), the racy read of the start value caught the attention of KCSAN and Dmitry unearthed that incorrectness. Rewrite it so that all id operations are under the hash lock.
Title posix-timers: Ensure timer ID search-loop limit is valid
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2025-10-22T13:23:57.127Z

Reserved: 2025-10-22T13:21:37.348Z

Link: CVE-2023-53728

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2025-10-22T14:15:48.083

Modified: 2025-10-22T21:12:48.953

Link: CVE-2023-53728

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Low

Publid Date: 2025-10-22T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2023-53728 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.