wolfSSL prior to 5.6.6 did not check that messages in one (D)TLS record do not span key boundaries. As a result, it was possible to combine (D)TLS messages using different keys into one (D)TLS record. The most extreme edge case is that, in (D)TLS 1.3, it was possible that an unencrypted (D)TLS 1.3 record from the server containing first a ServerHello message and then the rest of the first server flight would be accepted by a wolfSSL client. In (D)TLS 1.3 the handshake is encrypted after the ServerHello but a wolfSSL client would accept an unencrypted flight from the server. This does not compromise key negotiation and authentication so it is assigned a low severity rating.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
No history.
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: wolfSSL
Published: 2024-02-15T17:21:44.342Z
Updated: 2024-08-02T08:42:08.518Z
Reserved: 2023-12-18T22:03:02.400Z
Link: CVE-2023-6937
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2024-08-02T08:42:08.518Z
NVD
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2024-02-15T18:15:44.890
Modified: 2024-02-15T19:55:09.230
Link: CVE-2023-6937
Redhat
No data.