Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-3842-1 | linux-5.10 security update |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6893-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6893-2 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6893-3 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6898-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6898-2 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6898-3 | Linux kernel kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6898-4 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6917-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6918-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6919-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-6927-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7019-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
References
History
Thu, 22 Jan 2026 23:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Debian
Debian debian Linux |
|
| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-noinfo | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.9:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.9:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Debian
Debian debian Linux |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 22 Nov 2024 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Tue, 05 Nov 2024 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-05-04T09:07:18.449Z
Reserved: 2024-05-17T13:50:33.108Z
Link: CVE-2024-35871
Updated: 2024-06-17T17:38:52.800Z
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2024-05-19T09:15:08.507
Modified: 2026-01-22T20:21:18.273
Link: CVE-2024-35871
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2025-07-12T22:31:25Z
Weaknesses
Debian DLA
Ubuntu USN