Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
History

Tue, 03 Sep 2024 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:quinn_project:quinn:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
Vendors & Products Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 02 Sep 2024 17:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Title Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`
Weaknesses CWE-670
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published: 2024-09-02T16:45:39.465Z

Updated: 2024-09-03T14:04:46.433Z

Reserved: 2024-08-26T18:25:35.444Z

Link: CVE-2024-45311

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2024-09-03T14:04:29.165Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2024-09-02T18:15:37.373

Modified: 2024-09-03T12:59:02.453

Link: CVE-2024-45311

cve-icon Redhat

No data.