In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers
Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate
packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call
invalidates packet pointers.
Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes
use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for
global sub-programs, such that the following program could be
rejected:
int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0);
return 0;
}
SEC("tc")
int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data;
... make p valid ...
tail_call(sk);
*p = 42; /* this is unsafe */
...
}
The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that
can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with
tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.
bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers
Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate
packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call
invalidates packet pointers.
Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes
use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for
global sub-programs, such that the following program could be
rejected:
int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0);
return 0;
}
SEC("tc")
int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data;
... make p valid ...
tail_call(sk);
*p = 42; /* this is unsafe */
...
}
The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that
can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with
tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2025-13373 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call invalidates packet pointers. Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for global sub-programs, such that the following program could be rejected: int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk) { bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0); return 0; } SEC("tc") int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; ... make p valid ... tail_call(sk); *p = 42; /* this is unsafe */ ... } The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call. |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7513-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7513-2 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7513-3 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7513-4 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7513-5 | Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7514-1 | Linux kernel (NVIDIA) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7515-1 | Linux kernel (GKE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7515-2 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7522-1 | Linux kernel (Azure, N-Series) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7523-1 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7524-1 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Mon, 10 Nov 2025 17:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-476 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Sat, 12 Jul 2025 13:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
epss
|
epss
|
Fri, 09 May 2025 08:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Tue, 06 May 2025 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Mon, 05 May 2025 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call invalidates packet pointers. Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for global sub-programs, such that the following program could be rejected: int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk) { bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0); return 0; } SEC("tc") int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; ... make p valid ... tail_call(sk); *p = 42; /* this is unsafe */ ... } The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call. | |
| Title | bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers | |
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-05-09T08:06:10.185Z
Reserved: 2025-04-16T07:19:43.804Z
Link: CVE-2024-58237
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2025-05-05T15:15:54.010
Modified: 2025-11-10T17:35:27.920
Link: CVE-2024-58237
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2025-07-13T11:21:49Z
EUVD
Ubuntu USN