In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.
The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.
Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.
Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.
Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.
[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.
The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.
Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.
Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.
Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.
[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
| Linux |
|
Configuration 1 [-]
|
No data.
No data.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
 EUVD |
EUVD-2025-6211 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log] |
 Ubuntu USN |
USN-7379-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-7379-2 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-7380-1 | Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-7381-1 | Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-7382-1 | Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-noinfo | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
Fri, 07 Mar 2025 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Thu, 06 Mar 2025 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log] | |
| Title | seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering | |
| References |
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-05-04T07:22:07.345Z
Reserved: 2024-12-29T08:45:45.777Z
Link: CVE-2025-21834
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2025-03-06T17:15:23.397
Modified: 2025-10-29T20:58:07.367
Link: CVE-2025-21834
Redhat
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.