Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 | runc container escape via "masked path" abuse due to mount race conditions |
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Thu, 06 Nov 2025 20:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Opencontainers
Opencontainers runc |
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| Vendors & Products |
Opencontainers
Opencontainers runc |
Thu, 06 Nov 2025 20:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Thu, 06 Nov 2025 19:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw was found in runc. This flaw exploits an issue with how masked paths are implementedin runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's /dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace /dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the symlink target read-write. | runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7 and below, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.1, 1.4.0-rc.1 and 1.4.0-rc.2 files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's /dev/null) was actually a real /dev/null inode when using the container's /dev/null to mask. This exposes two methods of attack: an arbitrary mount gadget, leading to host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a bypassing of maskedPaths. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3. |
| Title | runc: container escape via 'masked path' abuse due to mount race conditions | runc container escape via "masked path" abuse due to mount race conditions |
| Weaknesses | CWE-363 CWE-61 |
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| References |
|
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Thu, 06 Nov 2025 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw was found in runc. This flaw exploits an issue with how masked paths are implementedin runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's /dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace /dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the symlink target read-write. | |
| Title | runc: container escape via 'masked path' abuse due to mount race conditions | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-59 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2025-11-06T19:22:22.047Z
Reserved: 2025-03-26T15:04:52.627Z
Link: CVE-2025-31133
Updated: 2025-11-06T19:08:17.594Z
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-11-06T19:15:41.343
Modified: 2025-11-06T19:45:09.883
Link: CVE-2025-31133
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2025-11-06T20:19:06Z
Github GHSA