In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

Each recvmsg() call must process either
- only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
- one non-DATA record

If the next record has different type than what has already been
processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record
has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where
we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record
to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.

Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,
since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,
and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext
skb for access to metadata like length).

Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing
loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and
then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case
we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's
zero length.
Advisories
Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4328-1 linux-6.1 security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6008-1 linux security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6009-1 linux security update
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2025-31542 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7833-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7834-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7833-2 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-2 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-3 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7833-3 Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7833-4 Linux kernel (GCP) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-4 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7856-1 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-5 Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7835-6 Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7887-1 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7887-2 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7940-1 Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Mon, 03 Nov 2025 18:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References

Sat, 06 Sep 2025 09:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel

Sat, 06 Sep 2025 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.0, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important


Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
Title tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
References

Projects

Sign in to view the affected projects.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2025-11-03T17:42:13.673Z

Reserved: 2025-04-16T07:20:57.113Z

Link: CVE-2025-39682

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2025-09-05T18:15:44.670

Modified: 2025-11-03T18:16:38.987

Link: CVE-2025-39682

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2025-09-05T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2025-39682 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2025-09-06T09:01:37Z

Weaknesses

No weakness.