{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2025-53627", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2025-07-07T14:20:38.388Z", "datePublished": "2025-12-29T16:18:29.680Z", "dateUpdated": "2025-12-29T16:52:03.331Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Meshtastic firmware allows forged DMs with no PKC to show up as encrypted", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-1287", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-377p-prwp-4hwf", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-377p-prwp-4hwf"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "meshtastic", "product": "firmware", "versions": [{"version": ">= 2.5, < 2.7.15", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2025-12-29T16:28:55.816Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the `pki_encrypted` flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-377p-prwp-4hwf", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2025-12-29T16:51:54.751669Z", "id": "CVE-2025-53627", "options": [{"Exploitation": "poc"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2025-12-29T16:52:03.331Z"}}]}}

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