Query ID predictable from a short sequence of observations
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NLnet Labs | Net::DNS | unaffected |
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Vendor Solution
This issue is fixed in 1.58 and all later versions.
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
No EPSS score available.
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://www.net-dns.org/downloads/CVE-2026-101340.txt |
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::DNS uses a 16-bit query ID to match responses to the corresponding requests. In versions up to and including 1.57, the ID is obtained from Perl's built-in rand() function. An attacker that can observe the sequence of query IDs is able to expose the internal state of the PNRG and hence predict query IDs before they are transmitted. The victim Net::DNS instance is then exposed to forged responses injected by the attacker. Note that the deduplication cache in 1.57 has no impact on the feasibility of this attack. | |
| Title | Query ID predictable from a short sequence of observations | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-338 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
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