The vulnerability allows unauthenticated POST requests to /api/webhook when the TerraformRepository credentials omit a webhookSecret or set it to an empty value. An attacker who can reach the Burrito server and knows the URL of a tracked repository can forge GitHub or GitLab events that create or delete TerraformPullRequest resources with arbitrary Branch, Base, and ID fields. For pull_request webhook types, the controller uses the supplied pull‑request number to fetch file changes but does not verify that the payload’s branch matches that number. This mismatch permits an attacker to pair a real pull‑request number with an unrelated branch, causing an unauthorized terraform plan against the operator’s stored git and cloud credentials. The generated plan can be posted to the real pull‑request’s comment thread, exposing the content of another branch’s infrastructure changes. Auto‑apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so the vulnerability alone cannot trigger terraform apply; however, the plan‑time execution can invoke provider and data‑source code from the chosen branch, potentially exposing secrets or executing arbitrary code.

The affected product is padok-team Burrito, a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software Kubernetes operator. All releases prior to version 0.13.0 are impacted. Version 0.13.0 and later contain the fix that requires webhookSecret to be set and enforces signature verification.

The CVSS score of 9.9 classifies this flaw as critical, reflecting the ability to perform unauthorized actions with high confidence. The EPSS score is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, but the lack of authentication on the webhook endpoint means that the attack vector is readily exploitable over the network by any host that can reach the Burrito server. An attacker must know a repository URL and be able to craft a valid event payload, both of which are realistic prerequisites for a malicious actor targeting a known deployment.