CVE-2026-107335

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data in Malcolm

Published Oct 8, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Malcolm’s upload‑processing pipeline enforces limits only when extracting container archives, but those limits are not applied to single‑stream compressed formats such as .gz or .xz. An authenticated user can upload a highly compressible file that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk. The resulting disk consumption exhausts the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, leading to service disruption for all users.

Affected Systems

The issue impacts Malcolm versions prior to v26.08.0. Any installation that allows authenticated uploads of PCAP or log files and shares a Docker volume among services is vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 6.5, indicating moderate severity, with no EPSS score available and no presence in the CISA KEV catalog. The likely attack vector requires authenticated access to the upload endpoint; once a crafted compressed file is uploaded, the platform experiences rapid resource exhaustion that can be repeatedly triggered by any compromised or malicious user.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Update to version v26.08.0


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update Malcolm to version v26.08.0 or later.
  • Disable or restrict the upload of single‑stream compressed files by enforcing a size cap or rejecting such formats.
  • Configure Docker volume quotas or monitoring to prevent a single process from consuming all available storage space.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 8, 2026 at 18:28 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Cisagov
Cisagov malcolm
Vendors & Products Cisagov
Cisagov malcolm
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.
Title Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data in Malcolm
Weaknesses CWE-409
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-409

    Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
icscert
Published
Updated
Oct 14, 2026, 7:36 PM
Reserved
Oct 7, 2026, 6:31 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Oct 8, 2026, 6:17 PM
Modified
Oct 13, 2026, 5:17 PM