CVE-2026-108267

Privasys Go fork: RA-TLS challenge mode did not bind attestation evidence to the TLS session

Published Oct 9, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 9.1 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Privasys Go is a maintained fork of the Go programming language that adds RA-TLS support to crypto/tls. Prior to privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5, challenge-mode RA-TLS certificates bound quote ReportData to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept a handshake terminated by the attacker as an attested enclave connection. This issue is fixed in privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Privasys Go adds RA‑TLS support to Go’s crypto/tls, but before privasys‑v0.5.1‑go1.26.5 the challenge‑mode certificates failed to bind the attestation evidence (quote ReportData) to the active TLS session. An attacker who can obtain an enclave TLS private key could replay a genuine quote onto a different connection, causing a relying party to accept a handshake that the attacker actually terminated as if it were a fully attested enclave. This results in the attacker masquerading as a legitimate, trusted enclave and potentially gaining unauthorized access to or tampering with sensitive data that the enclave is intended to protect.

Affected Systems

The flaw exists in all deployments of the Privasys Go fork that predate and do not include version privasys‑v0.5.1‑go1.26.5. That release incorporates the fix by binding the attestation evidence directly to the TLS session. Versions prior to that are vulnerable until the patch is applied.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.1 reflects a high‑severity flaw. No EPSS score is available, but the vulnerability can be exploited once an attacker has the enclave’s private key, a capability that attackers with hardware or privileged access can often attain. Although the issue is not yet listed in the CISA KEV catalog, its impact is severe because it enables impersonation of a verified enclave without requiring additional network access beyond the compromised key.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to Privasys Go privasys‑v0.5.1‑go1.26.5 or newer, which binds attestation evidence to each TLS session
  • If upgrading immediately is not feasible, disable RA‑TLS challenge mode or remove RA‑TLS usage from unpatched deployments until the patch can be applied
  • Ensure that enclave TLS private keys are stored in a protected HSM or otherwise inaccessible to prevent key extraction
  • Place monitoring on TLS handshakes to detect replays or inconsistencies in attestation evidence, and alert when signatures no longer match the session context

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 9, 2026 at 22:50 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Privasys
Privasys go
Vendors & Products Privasys
Privasys go
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Privasys Go is a maintained fork of the Go programming language that adds RA-TLS support to crypto/tls. Prior to privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5, challenge-mode RA-TLS certificates bound quote ReportData to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept a handshake terminated by the attacker as an attested enclave connection. This issue is fixed in privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5.
Title Privasys Go fork: RA-TLS challenge mode did not bind attestation evidence to the TLS session
Weaknesses CWE-346
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 13, 2026, 3:53 PM
Reserved
Oct 9, 2026, 5:33 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 9, 2026, 10:16 PM
Modified
Oct 16, 2026, 8:04 PM