Privasys Go adds RA‑TLS support to Go’s crypto/tls, but before privasys‑v0.5.1‑go1.26.5 the challenge‑mode certificates failed to bind the attestation evidence (quote ReportData) to the active TLS session. An attacker who can obtain an enclave TLS private key could replay a genuine quote onto a different connection, causing a relying party to accept a handshake that the attacker actually terminated as if it were a fully attested enclave. This results in the attacker masquerading as a legitimate, trusted enclave and potentially gaining unauthorized access to or tampering with sensitive data that the enclave is intended to protect.

The flaw exists in all deployments of the Privasys Go fork that predate and do not include version privasys‑v0.5.1‑go1.26.5. That release incorporates the fix by binding the attestation evidence directly to the TLS session. Versions prior to that are vulnerable until the patch is applied.

The CVSS score of 9.1 reflects a high‑severity flaw. No EPSS score is available, but the vulnerability can be exploited once an attacker has the enclave’s private key, a capability that attackers with hardware or privileged access can often attain. Although the issue is not yet listed in the CISA KEV catalog, its impact is severe because it enables impersonation of a verified enclave without requiring additional network access beyond the compromised key.