CVE-2026-108269

ra-tls-clients: RA-TLS challenge verifier accepted quotes not bound to the TLS session

Published Oct 9, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 9.1 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.5.0, the Rust and Go RA-TLS challenge verifiers accepted quote ReportData that was bound to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session before permitting application traffic. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing the clients to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in 0.5.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The flaw allows an attacker who gains the enclave TLS private key to replay a valid attestation quote on a different TLS session. Because the RA-TLS challenge verifier did not tie the quote's ReportData to the active TLS session, the client incorrectly accepted the relayed quote and established application traffic with an untrusted connection. This effectively allows the attacker to masquerade as the protected enclave, potentially enabling remote code execution or unauthorized data access. The weakness maps to CWE-346, which concerns missing or incorrect cryptographic security checks.

Affected Systems

Systems using Privasys ra-tls-clients any release prior to 0.5.0 are affected. These include Rust and Go clients that perform the RA-TLS challenge verification without session binding. The product is provided by Privasys and the vulnerability exists in all implementations before the 0.5.0 release.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.1 categorizes this vulnerability as critical. Although EPSS is not available, the lack of a KEV listing does not reduce the risk; the high severity and the nature of the flaw suggest a high likelihood of exploitation if an attacker can access an enclave private key. The attack requires the adversary to obtain the TLS private key and relay a quote; no further privileges are needed beyond that. Mitigation requires upgrading the client to at least 0.5.0, which adds proper TLS session binding.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to RA-TLS client version 0.5.0 or newer.
  • Protect enclave TLS private keys with hardware security modules or secure key storage to reduce the chance of key compromise.
  • Monitor system and application logs for unexpected attestation quote verifications and TLS session anomalies, and respond to any suspicious activity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 9, 2026 at 22:20 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients
Vendors & Products Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.5.0, the Rust and Go RA-TLS challenge verifiers accepted quote ReportData that was bound to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session before permitting application traffic. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing the clients to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in 0.5.0.
Title ra-tls-clients: RA-TLS challenge verifier accepted quotes not bound to the TLS session
Weaknesses CWE-346
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 13, 2026, 8:25 PM
Reserved
Oct 9, 2026, 5:33 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 9, 2026, 10:16 PM
Modified
Oct 16, 2026, 8:04 PM