Description
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Before 0.9.1, an attacker with local access could modify workload code, data, and configuration at any time after successful connection establishment. Once Evidence was successfully appraised and the connection was established, there was a window of vulnerability from the establishment of the connection to the termination of the connection where an attacker could modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS endpoint acting as the Attester. This vulnerability was possible because Privasys/ra-tls-clients performed attestation only once in the lifetime of the connection (at connection establishment time), and the verifying peer continued to believe that the state was the same as in the initial Evidence throughout, whereas it could be stale at some point in time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.1.
Published: 2026-10-12
Score: 7.2 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Integrity Compromise
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients performs attestation only once when the connection is established. An attacker with local access can modify workload code, data, or configuration after a successful connection and before the connection is terminated, creating a TOCTOU window. This allows the app to believe the verified evidence remains current while the real state has changed, enabling tampering of the workload at runtime.

Affected Systems

Affected product: Privasys ra-tls-clients, any version earlier than 0.9.1. The vulnerability applies to all language utilities provided by this client library. No specific CPE strings or product subcomponents are listed, so all pre‑0.9.1 releases are at risk.

Risk and Exploitability

CVSS score is 7.2, indicating high severity. EPSS is not available, and the CVE is not listed in KEV. Exploitation requires local access; the attacker must be able to run code on the same host as the client to modify its state while a handshake is in progress. Because the flaw originates from a temporal race condition (CWE‑367), there is no network‑based attack vector; it is a local privilege or local user security issue. Given the high CVSS, operators should treat this as a serious risk until the issue is corrected.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 12, 2026 at 20:36 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to version 0.9.1 or later to remove the single‑time attestation logic.
  • Limit the client’s execution to a hardened environment with strict local‑user restrictions, preventing unauthorized code, data, or configuration changes during active connections.
  • Deploy file‑integrity monitoring or configuration management tools to detect and alert on changes to the client or its runtime resources.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 12, 2026 at 20:36 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Thu, 15 Oct 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 12 Oct 2026 22:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients
Vendors & Products Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients

Mon, 12 Oct 2026 19:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Before 0.9.1, an attacker with local access could modify workload code, data, and configuration at any time after successful connection establishment. Once Evidence was successfully appraised and the connection was established, there was a window of vulnerability from the establishment of the connection to the termination of the connection where an attacker could modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS endpoint acting as the Attester. This vulnerability was possible because Privasys/ra-tls-clients performed attestation only once in the lifetime of the connection (at connection establishment time), and the verifying peer continued to believe that the state was the same as in the initial Evidence throughout, whereas it could be stale at some point in time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.1.
Title Privasys Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to TOCTOU Attacks
Weaknesses CWE-367
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Privasys Ra-tls-clients
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-15T13:41:30.986Z

Reserved: 2026-10-09T20:32:44.301Z

Link: CVE-2026-108361

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-10-15T13:41:27.454Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-10-12T20:17:07.900

Modified: 2026-10-16T20:04:29.760

Link: CVE-2026-108361

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-12T22:00:16Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-367

    Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition