CVE-2026-108362

Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)

Published Oct 12, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 9.1 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability allows a network attacker to forge or steal attestation evidence from a compromised unrevoked TEE platform. Because the verifier does not require an explicitly authorized platform identity, it accepts evidence that belongs to any unrevoked TEE as if it originated from the intended attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint, potentially leading to man‑in‑the‑middle attacks and unauthorized data access. This flaw represents a serious authentication bypass, classified as CWE‑346.

Affected Systems

The affected product is Privasys ra‑tls‑clients. All releases prior to version 0.11.0 are vulnerable; the fix was introduced in release v0.11.0. Users of any earlier version should consider their installations at risk until the update is applied.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.1 highlights the high severity of this flaw. EPSS data is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The attack vector is inferred to involve a remote attacker who can forge or extract attestation secrets over a network and supply them to the TLS verifier. Once the evidence is accepted, the attacker can fully impersonate the TLS endpoint, gaining control over encrypted communications.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to Privasys ra‑tls‑clients v0.11.0 or newer to apply the fix.
  • Reconfigure the TLS client to require explicit verification of the attester’s platform identity before accepting evidence.
  • Audit all deployed TEE platforms for unauthorized or compromised devices and revoke any that are detected.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 12, 2026 at 20:37 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients
Vendors & Products Privasys
Privasys ra-tls-clients
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.
Title Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)
Weaknesses CWE-346
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 13, 2026, 3:00 PM
Reserved
Oct 9, 2026, 8:32 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 12, 2026, 8:17 PM
Modified
Oct 16, 2026, 8:04 PM