Technical impact
The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library contains a flaw where the HTTPArtifact::receive() function verifies the outer signed ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). An attacker who controls a trusted Identity Provider can therefore submit a signed outer artifact that contains an unsigned inner response claiming a different issuer, allowing the service provider to accept the forged assertion. The result is that a user’s identity can be substituted or forged, enabling unauthorized access or privilege escalation without detectable tampering between the IdP and the service provider. This flaw directly undermines the integrity of the authentication flow and, because it relies only on the outer signature, it can be exploited without any additional credentials, effectively bypassing the intended message‑level security.
Affected Systems
Deployments of the SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library that run versions 6.2.2 through 6.2.3, and any builds prior to 7.0.0‑rc2, are affected. The vulnerability is fixed in release 6.2.4 and the subsequent 7.0.0‑rc2 release; installations of those or newer revisions are not impacted.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 8.7 classifies this issue as High severity, and the absence of an EPSS score or KEV listing indicates that exploitation is not yet widespread but remains plausible. The attack requires control over a trusted IdP and a service provider that uses the HTTP‑Artifact binding without independently validating the embedded response’s signature. In realistic multi‑IdP federations, these conditions can be met, making the vulnerability significant for environments that accept multiple, unverified IdPs or rely solely on the outer artifact verification.
Github GHSA