CVE-2026-116794

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

Published Oct 28, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

This bug in the russh SSH library causes the agent server to skip the required confirmation step for keys added with the confirm constraint (ssh-add -c). The result is that any process able to interact with the agent socket—such as an attacker who can reach the local socket or exploit a forwarded agent—can sign data or authenticate as the user without the intended authorization check. The flaw is a classic authorization bypass (CWE‑862) and allows an adversary to effectively use the victim’s private keys without consent.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the russh library provided by Eugeny. Versions from 0.50.0‑beta.12 up through 0.65.0 are impacted due to the incomplete confirm handling in the agent server code.

Risk and Exploitability

With a CVSS score of 8.3, this issue poses a high‑risk path for privilege escalation or unauthorized access. The EPSS score is less than 1%, but the vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog. If an attacker can bind to or otherwise reach the SSH agent socket—directly or via forwarded agent—a signing request can be made that bypasses the confirmation policy. The risk is heightened in environments that enforce strict key confirmation for sensitive operations.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade your russh library to version 0.65.0 or later to restore proper confirmation logic.
  • If you override Agent::confirm for custom policy, ensure that the override remains active after the update and that the confirmation hook is still invoked for each signing request.
  • Restrict access to the SSH agent socket and disable agent forwarding unless absolutely necessary, limiting the attack surface for this bypass.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 30, 2026 at 01:59 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-358
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Eugeny
Eugeny russh
Vendors & Products Eugeny
Eugeny russh
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
Title russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation
Weaknesses CWE-862
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-358

    Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard

  • CWE-862

    Missing Authorization

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Nov 3, 2026, 1:08 PM
Reserved
Oct 26, 2026, 9:53 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 28, 2026, 6:17 PM
Modified
Nov 4, 2026, 11:10 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Oct 28, 2026, 5:06 PM