Technical impact
The flaw allows an attacker who can submit a pull‑request review to specify a commit identifier that is not actually part of that pull request. When a review is posted, Gitea looked at the commit named in the review for the workflow definition. Because the fork restrictions were derived from the pull request, but the specific commit was not validated, the runner executed the workflow using the repository’s secrets and granted the attacker a GITEA_TOKEN with write permission. The combination of arbitrary workflow execution, secret exposure, and repository write access amounts to a full remote code execution and privilege escalation in the repository context.
Affected Systems
Any Gitea instance that supports forked workflow execution, regardless of build number. A patch was applied in release 28.3.0, which curtails the validation logic. Because the affected-version list is not supplied, all prior releases that enabled pull‑request review‑triggered workflows remain vulnerable.
Risk and Exploitability
The vulnerability can be triggered remotely by any user who has read access to the repository and who can submit a pull‑request review, using either a forked pull request or a direct commit via an AGit push. The attacker does not need elevated privileges beyond read access, and the exploitation requires no additional configuration. The CVSS score is 6.5, EPSS < 1%, and KEV not listed, but the described consequence of arbitrary workflow execution with repository secrets and write access indicates a moderate‑severity risk. Without mitigation, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in the context of the repository owner and potentially alter or delete critical data.