Technical impact
A repository in Gitea that had been registered as a source of scoped workflows maintained that registration even after being transferred to a new owner. The new owner could then modify the workflow definitions, and those workflows continued to run in the original owner’s repositories, giving the new owner access to the former owner’s Actions secrets and job tokens. This flaw effectively exposes sensitive secrets and allows the attacker to execute code in the account of the previous owner, representing a privilege escalation and secret disclosure vulnerability.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability affects Gitea servers that utilize scoped workflows and allow repository transfers. Any Gitea instance running a version prior to 28.4.0 that has enabled scoped workflows is potentially exposed. The fix was introduced in Gitea 28.4.0, which removes owner‑level registrations upon transfer and ignores registrations from sources that no longer belong to the registering owner.
Risk and Exploitability
Because the flaw is triggered by a repository transfer, an attacker must first transfer a repository that is registered for scoped workflows. Once the transfer occurs, the attacker can modify the workflow files in the new repository; those changes will propagate to the original owner’s repositories, running with the original secrets. The lack of an EPSS score and absence from the KEV catalog indicate no publicly known exploits yet, but the severity of the potential secret exposure and code execution makes the threat significant. The exploit is relatively straightforward for an attacker with access to the transfer mechanism, suggesting a moderate to high likelihood of abuse in environments permitting untrusted transfers.