CVE-2026-118657

Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers

Published Oct 28, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Echo’s Context.Scheme logic unconditionally trusts any forwarded scheme header sent by the client. Consequently, an attacker who connects over unencrypted HTTP can set the scheme value to HTTPS, causing the framework to treat the request as secure and skip the HTTPSRedirect middleware. Separately, an attacker that controls the TLS‑terminating proxy can inject a forwarded scheme claiming HTTP, which not only masquerades the connection as insecure but also suppresses the Strict‑Transport‑Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. This allows secure‑only redirects and browser‑enforced HTTPS to be bypassed, potentially downgrading traffic or evading HSTS protection. The weakness is an improper trust of a forwarded value (CWE‑346).

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects any deployed instance of the Labstack Echo framework that is older than version 4.16.0 or 5.4.0. All releases prior to those, such as Echo 4.15.9 and earlier, or Echo 5.3.x and earlier, are vulnerable because they lack a mechanism to restrict trusted sources for forwarded scheme headers.

Risk and Exploitability

The base metric CVSS score of 5.9 indicates moderate severity. The EPSS score is < 1%, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires an attacker to send a forged forwarded scheme header either directly to the application over plain HTTP or via a TLS‑terminating proxy that forwards the header. The description specifies that the framework trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client; it does not name a particular header, but the analysis infers that common headers such as X‑Forwarded‑Proto could be used. If direct backend access is blocked and a trusted proxy reliably overwrites forwarded headers, the practical risk is reduced, yet the framework provides no built‑in guard against untrusted forwarded headers.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Echo to version 4.16.0 or later, or to 5.4.0 or later, to gain the fixed logic that requires trusted source for scheme headers
  • If an upgrade is not possible, configure the application or hosting environment to strip or override any forwarded scheme headers before the request reaches Echo
  • Ensure the application runs behind a trusted TLS‑terminating proxy that rewrites scheme headers to HTTPS and block direct backend access so that only the proxy can provide scheme information

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 6, 2026 at 02:10 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Labstack
Labstack echo
Vendors & Products Labstack
Labstack echo
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.
Title Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers
Weaknesses CWE-346
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-346

    Origin Validation Error

  • CWE-807

    Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Nov 3, 2026, 1:32 PM
Reserved
Oct 28, 2026, 5:25 PM
Status
Undergoing Analysis
Published
Oct 28, 2026, 9:16 PM
Modified
Nov 3, 2026, 2:17 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Oct 28, 2026, 8:14 PM