CVE-2026-118986

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand()

Published Oct 30, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand().

The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline.

An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability arises because CallBackery generates the session cookie signing secret by calling the non‑cryptographic rand() function twice, which is seeded with only 32 bits. As a result, the secret can have at most 2^32 possibilities, and a single captured signed cookie is enough to brute‑force the secret offline, after which an attacker can sign arbitrary cookies. This flaw enables an attacker to impersonate any user, including privileged accounts, thereby compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. The weakness is an instance of CWE‑338 (Prediction or Guessing of a Secret).

Affected Systems

CallBackery for Perl, versions prior to 0.62.0. No other vendors or products are listed as affected.

Risk and Exploitability

The secret’s 32‑bit entropy makes brute‑forcing trivial; a single valid session cookie suffices to recover the signing secret and forge any number of additional cookies. The CVSS score of 7.5 indicates high severity, and the EPSS score of < 1% shows a very low but non‑zero likelihood of exploitation. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The attack vector is inferred to be remote, requiring the attacker to obtain a session cookie in transit or through client‑side exploitation. Though the overall exploitation probability is low, the potential impact is high, making this a serious risk for any system uses the affected CallBackery version.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to CallBackery 0.62.0 or later.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade CallBackery to version 0.62.0 or later, which replaces the rand() based signing secret with a more secure mechanism.
  • Invalidate or delete all existing session cookies on the system to close any existing exploitation window, such as by restarting the application or rotating the session configuration.
  • Reconfigure the application to use a cryptographically secure random number generator for session cookie signing until the official patch is applied, ensuring the signing secret cannot be predicted or reproduced.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 6, 2026 at 19:06 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Perl
Perl callbackery
Vendors & Products Perl
Perl callbackery
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand(). The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline. An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.
Title CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand()
Weaknesses CWE-338
References
Weaknesses
  • CWE-338

    Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
CPANSec
Published
Updated
Nov 6, 2026, 4:46 PM
Reserved
Oct 29, 2026, 10:48 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 30, 2026, 2:16 PM
Modified
Nov 6, 2026, 5:17 PM