CVE-2026-120306

Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation

Published Nov 1, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 9.9 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability arises from Beam's Beta9 worker executing tenant shell commands as Dockerfile RUN directives using Buildah with a chroot isolation setting. Because Buildah runs without specifying --isolation, the workspace only changes the filesystem root while sharing the worker’s PID, IPC, network namespaces and running as root with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. This design allows a tenant build step to access and modify the writable root file system of the worker container, exposing critical binaries such as runc, buildah, and runsc, the worker’s Kubernetes service account token, and host‑mounted directories. As a result, an attacker controlling a tenant image build can escape the intended isolation boundary and execute arbitrary code on the underlying host, effectively achieving remote code execution and privilege escalation.

Affected Systems

The affected product is the beam‑cloud Beta9 worker. Versions prior to worker‑0.1.756 contain the issue. The fix is provided in worker‑0.1.756 (released 2026‑09‑15) and also in gateway‑0.1.776, which shares the same commit that improves isolation to use private PID, IPC, and network namespaces.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 9.9, indicating a high severity exploit. The EPSS score is not available, but the lack of a KEV listing does not mitigate the risk. Based on the description, the attack vector is internal to the worker’s execution context and requires the attacker to submit a tenant image build or otherwise influence the worker’s build command. Because the worker runs privileged, an exploitation attempt would immediately have root‑level access to the host, making the vulnerability highly dangerous if the tenant build is controllable by an attacker.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. That release drops chroot isolation: Buildah RUN steps use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant build arguments are applied inside the build container rather than in the Buildah process environment. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15. Gateway 0.1.776 is the gateway tag cut from the same commit; the isolation change itself is in the worker image.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Beam‑Beta9 worker to version 0.1.756 or newer, which replaces chroot isolation with OCI isolation and limits tenant arguments to the build container.
  • If an upgrade cannot be performed immediately, reconfigure the worker pods to run non‑privileged with the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability removed and disable shared PID, IPC, and network namespaces so /proc/1/root is no longer writable.
  • Configure the orchestrator or container runtime to reject or sandbox tenant image build requests that require privileged access, ensuring that only trusted users can submit build steps.
  • Monitor worker logs for unexpected use of runc/buildah binaries and establish alerts for anomalous patterns indicating unauthorized build activity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 1, 2026 at 14:50 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Beam-cloud
Beam-cloud beta9
Vendors & Products Beam-cloud
Beam-cloud beta9
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
Title Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation
Weaknesses CWE-269
CWE-653
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-269

    Improper Privilege Management

  • CWE-653

    Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
JFROG
Published
Updated
Nov 2, 2026, 7:47 PM
Reserved
Nov 1, 2026, 12:32 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Nov 1, 2026, 1:18 PM
Modified
Nov 2, 2026, 8:17 PM