Technical impact
The vulnerability arises from Beam's Beta9 worker executing tenant shell commands as Dockerfile RUN directives using Buildah with a chroot isolation setting. Because Buildah runs without specifying --isolation, the workspace only changes the filesystem root while sharing the worker’s PID, IPC, network namespaces and running as root with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. This design allows a tenant build step to access and modify the writable root file system of the worker container, exposing critical binaries such as runc, buildah, and runsc, the worker’s Kubernetes service account token, and host‑mounted directories. As a result, an attacker controlling a tenant image build can escape the intended isolation boundary and execute arbitrary code on the underlying host, effectively achieving remote code execution and privilege escalation.
Affected Systems
The affected product is the beam‑cloud Beta9 worker. Versions prior to worker‑0.1.756 contain the issue. The fix is provided in worker‑0.1.756 (released 2026‑09‑15) and also in gateway‑0.1.776, which shares the same commit that improves isolation to use private PID, IPC, and network namespaces.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score is 9.9, indicating a high severity exploit. The EPSS score is not available, but the lack of a KEV listing does not mitigate the risk. Based on the description, the attack vector is internal to the worker’s execution context and requires the attacker to submit a tenant image build or otherwise influence the worker’s build command. Because the worker runs privileged, an exploitation attempt would immediately have root‑level access to the host, making the vulnerability highly dangerous if the tenant build is controllable by an attacker.