{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-120307", "assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "JFROG", "dateReserved": "2026-11-01T12:45:12.430Z", "datePublished": "2026-11-01T12:49:51.981Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-01T12:49:51.981Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d", "shortName": "JFROG", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-01T12:49:51.981Z"}, "title": "Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-22", "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-23", "description": "CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-59", "description": "CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "beam-cloud", "product": "Beta9 worker", "collectionURL": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases", "packageName": "github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "repo": "git://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "programFiles": ["pkg/worker/container_server.go", "pkg/worker/lifecycle.go", "pkg/types/worker.go"], "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThan": "0.1.756", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.</p>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "name": "Beta9 repository", "tags": ["product"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897", "name": "Handle sandbox edge cases (fix pull request)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393", "name": "Fix commit a28bf12", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756", "name": "worker-0.1.756", "tags": ["release-notes"]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Tenant with a workspace token and a running sandbox on a worker that serves the sandbox file API"}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "baseScore": 9.9, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"}}], "solutions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. Sandbox file APIs and workspace sync use os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory segments and symbolic links stay inside the container root or the mount source. File operations refuse read-only mounts and do not write through a symlink swapped in after path resolution. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. Sandbox file APIs and workspace sync use os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory segments and symbolic links stay inside the container root or the mount source. File operations refuse read-only mounts and do not write through a symlink swapped in after path resolution. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15.</p>"}]}], "timeline": [{"time": "2026-09-15T04:03:00.000Z", "lang": "en", "value": "Fix merged in pull request 1897 (commit a28bf12)"}, {"time": "2026-09-15T04:03:00.000Z", "lang": "en", "value": "Fixed release worker-0.1.756 published. No vendor security advisory was filed with the pull request."}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Natan Nehorai", "type": "finder"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "JFrog Security Research", "type": "coordinator"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"}}}}

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{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "product": "Beta9 worker", "programFiles": ["pkg/worker/container_server.go", "pkg/worker/lifecycle.go", "pkg/types/worker.go"], "repo": "git://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "vendor": "beam-cloud", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.1.756", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "reefs@jfrog.com"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source."}], "id": "CVE-2026-120307", "lastModified": "2026-11-01T13:18:01.497", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.9, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "impactScore": 6.0, "source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-11-01T13:18:01.497", "references": [{"source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9"}, {"source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393"}, {"source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897"}, {"source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756"}], "sourceIdentifier": "reefs@jfrog.com", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-22"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-23"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-59"}], "source": "reefs@jfrog.com", "type": "Primary"}]}

{}

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