CVE-2026-120307

Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths

Published Nov 1, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 9.9 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The Beta9 worker exposes a sandbox file API that incorrectly resolves container paths to host paths. The resolution logic allows a tenant to walk beyond the intended sandbox, enabling read, write, and delete operations on the worker's root filesystem as the container process runs with full privileges. The flaw can be leveraged to read sensitive files such as the Kubernetes service account token, which in the shipped manifests is bound to cluster‑admin. This capability to access arbitrary host files aligns with a high‑severity remote code execution risk where an attacker could potentially execute code on the host and compromise other tenants or the control plane.

Affected Systems

Beam‑Cloud’s Beta9 worker; tenants using a workspace token and a running sandbox are affected. The vulnerability is present in all releases prior to worker‑0.1.756. There is no version information beyond the upgrade target, so all earlier versions of the worker are at risk.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.9 signals a critical security issue. The EPSS score is not available, but the lack of a KEV listing does not mitigate the severity, especially since the vulnerability impacts container isolation. The attack vector is inferred to be remote, via the API endpoints such as upload, download, and workspace sync, which are publicly reachable by authenticated tenants.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. Sandbox file APIs and workspace sync use os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory segments and symbolic links stay inside the container root or the mount source. File operations refuse read-only mounts and do not write through a symlink swapped in after path resolution. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later to apply the path‑resolution fix.
  • Restrict the permissions of workspace tokens to remove cluster‑admin bindings, limiting host access even if a container escape occurs.
  • Deploy runtime monitoring to detect unexpected file accesses or symlink traversal, and review logs for anomalies related to sandbox file API activity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 1, 2026 at 14:21 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Beam-cloud
Beam-cloud beta9
Vendors & Products Beam-cloud
Beam-cloud beta9
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.
Title Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths
Weaknesses CWE-22
CWE-23
CWE-59
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-22

    Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

  • CWE-23

    Relative Path Traversal

  • CWE-59

    Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
JFROG
Published
Updated
Nov 2, 2026, 7:46 PM
Reserved
Nov 1, 2026, 12:45 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Nov 1, 2026, 1:18 PM
Modified
Nov 2, 2026, 8:17 PM