Technical impact
A sandbox that is supposed to isolate caller–supplied Python code actually runs that code inside Pyodide, a WebAssembly Python runtime, while a Deno subprocess is started with unrestricted file read, write, and network permissions. Because the Deno API is exposed on the JavaScript global object, the Python code can invoke Deno.readTextFileSync, Deno.writeTextFileSync, and write .pth files into the host’s virtual environment. The description indicates that this allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary files as the OS user and to persist code execution, effectively giving full remote control of the host system. The vulnerability is a classic example of privilege escalation due to insufficient sandbox isolation (CWE‑269, CWE‑693, CWE‑94). If exploited, the attacker can compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the server, executing arbitrary payloads and persisting thereafter. The attack requires the ability to submit Python code to the Generative UI sandbox, typically via the FastMCP generate_prefab_ui tool. When a FastMCP server has no authentication or the client is authorized to call tools, any client who can reach the server can trigger the vulnerable path. Verification of the presence of Deno is also required, as the sandbox uses it for I/O.
Affected Systems
The issue affects PrefectHQ Prefab UI versions 0.14.0 through 0.20.2 which launch Deno with the --allow-read, --allow-write, and --allow-net flags. The vulnerability is present only when the host has Deno installed and the Generative UI feature is enabled. Configurations where FastMCP’s GenerativeUI provider is used to forward user code to the sandbox are the most likely exposure.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS base score is 9.9, indicating Critical severity. The EPSS score is not available, but the lack of a KEV listing does not diminish the high risk inherent in the feature’s design. The likely vector for exploitation is remote code injection via the Generative UI tool, either from an unauthenticated client on an unprotected FastMCP server or from an authenticated user permitted to call tools. The lack of permission checks in the code path and the unrestricted Deno permissions make successful exploitation straightforward once a call can be made. The patch revokes these permissions before code evaluation and limits network access, removing the primary attack surface.