Technical impact
The AGit workflow used by Gitea lets users push refs/for/... to create pull requests. This workflow erroneously omitted a re‑check of the pusher's pull‑request permissions when the PR object was instantiated. Consequently, a user or an SSH deploy key that was granted only read access to the repository, or write access to the wiki, could open pull requests in a repository where they had no PR rights. This bypass allows the attacker to introduce arbitrary code into the PR queue without being granted the necessary authorization, effectively creating a privilege escalation path for code injection and potential compromise of the repository.
Affected Systems
The flaw exists in all Gitea releases up to but not including version 28.4.0. An attacker can exploit the issue only if they have a Git or SSH access that can push to refs/for/... in any affected repository. The official fix is released in Gitea 28.4.0, which restores the missing permission check.
Risk and Exploitability
The attack vector is a non‑interactive Git push to refs/for/..., and it does not require any user interaction beyond a repository password or SSH key. No CVSS score is supplied, but the EPSS score is unavailable and KEV does not list it, suggesting that large‑scale exploitation is not currently observed. Nevertheless, the capability to create pull requests without appropriate rights provides an avenue for arbitrary code injection and potential compromise of the repository’s codebase, warranting immediate remediation.