CVE-2026-125275

A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever

Published Nov 17, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 High EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
Description
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.

The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.

This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.

Analysis

No analysis available yet

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect. Restarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Title A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever
First Time appeared Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web
Weaknesses CWE-835
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-835

    Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 17, 2026, 2:54 AM
Reserved
Nov 11, 2026, 12:24 PM
Status
Received
Published
Nov 17, 2026, 3:17 AM
Modified
Nov 17, 2026, 3:17 AM