CVE-2026-129891

IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the installed public suffix list because update_self_from_url fetches it over cleartext HTTP with no integrity check

Published Nov 17, 2026 CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
Description
IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the installed public suffix list because update_self_from_url fetches it over cleartext HTTP with no integrity check.

Called with no argument, as the module's documentation shows, the updater fetches the list from the `http://` address in the URL constant and checks only that the request succeeded, with no signature or digest over the response. The lines that come back are written into the module's own source file as the built-in list.

An attacker on the network path when the updater runs chooses the suffix boundary the module reports to every caller on the host, and that answer persists in the installed module until it is reinstalled. Dropping one rule makes the hostname check in IO::Socket::SSL accept a wildcard certificate that spans the whole public suffix that rule named.

Analysis

No analysis available yet

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to a future IO-Socket-SSL release, or apply the upstream patch.


Vendor Workaround

Until a fixed release is available, pass an explicit https URL to update_self_from_url instead of calling it with no argument.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the installed public suffix list because update_self_from_url fetches it over cleartext HTTP with no integrity check. Called with no argument, as the module's documentation shows, the updater fetches the list from the `http://` address in the URL constant and checks only that the request succeeded, with no signature or digest over the response. The lines that come back are written into the module's own source file as the built-in list. An attacker on the network path when the updater runs chooses the suffix boundary the module reports to every caller on the host, and that answer persists in the installed module until it is reinstalled. Dropping one rule makes the hostname check in IO::Socket::SSL accept a wildcard certificate that spans the whole public suffix that rule named.
Title IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the installed public suffix list because update_self_from_url fetches it over cleartext HTTP with no integrity check
Weaknesses CWE-494
References

Subscriptions

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Weaknesses
  • CWE-494

    Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
CPANSec
Published
Updated
Nov 17, 2026, 11:39 PM
Reserved
Nov 16, 2026, 12:56 PM

No data.