CVE-2026-130627

Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)

Published Nov 17, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
Description
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The Vert.x HTTP client transport in the a2a-java SDK re‑issues POST redirects when PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is enabled, copying the entire request header map verbatim. It omits credential stripping and performs no same‑authority check. Consequently, if a server returns an absolute cross‑host Location header, the client will forward its Authorization header—including Bearer, Basic, or OAuth tokens—and any allowlisted API‑key headers to the attacker‑controlled host, leaking credentials and potentially sensitive data. This violates the project’s cross‑transport invariant that credentials must be removed on cross‑authority redirects. The weakness is an information exposure through credentials or passwords (CWE-522).

Affected Systems

The vulnerable component is the a2a-java SDK for Vert.x HTTP client (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx). Versions prior to 1.5.0.Final lack the RedirectHeaderPolicy that removes these headers on cross‑authority redirects. All releases from 1.5.0.Final onward contain the fix.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.5 indicates high severity. EPSS information is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. An attacker who can influence a 30x redirect response can redirect the client to an attacker‑controlled host. Because the client automatically follows such redirects with all headers intact, credential leakage occurs without the need for host‑level compromise. The risk is significant for applications that use automatic redirect following and rely on bearer or API‑key authentication.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to 1.5.0.Final or later. PR #1255 applies the shared RedirectHeaderPolicy to explicitly enabled, one-hop synchronous POST redirects across the JDK, Vert.x, and Android HTTP clients. The policy strips Authorization and the allowlisted API-key headers when a redirect crosses authorities. The reporter reviewed the proposed fix and confirmed that it addresses the reported issue.


Vendor Workaround

On affected versions, leave PostBuilder.followRedirects(false) (the default) so the SDK does not re-issue POST requests to redirect targets.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx to 1.5.0.Final or later
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure the client to keep PostBuilder.followRedirects(false) so no automatic POST redirects are re‑issued
  • Validate that any redirects are to same‑authority hosts or remove sensitive headers manually before following redirects

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 17, 2026 at 16:26 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Title Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)
Weaknesses CWE-522
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

Subscriptions

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Weaknesses
  • CWE-522

    Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
redhat-cnalr
Published
Updated
Nov 17, 2026, 2:21 PM
Reserved
Nov 17, 2026, 2:10 PM
Status
Received
Published
Nov 17, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Nov 17, 2026, 3:17 PM