Technical impact
The Vert.x HTTP client transport in the a2a-java SDK re‑issues POST redirects when PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is enabled, copying the entire request header map verbatim. It omits credential stripping and performs no same‑authority check. Consequently, if a server returns an absolute cross‑host Location header, the client will forward its Authorization header—including Bearer, Basic, or OAuth tokens—and any allowlisted API‑key headers to the attacker‑controlled host, leaking credentials and potentially sensitive data. This violates the project’s cross‑transport invariant that credentials must be removed on cross‑authority redirects. The weakness is an information exposure through credentials or passwords (CWE-522).
Affected Systems
The vulnerable component is the a2a-java SDK for Vert.x HTTP client (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx). Versions prior to 1.5.0.Final lack the RedirectHeaderPolicy that removes these headers on cross‑authority redirects. All releases from 1.5.0.Final onward contain the fix.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 7.5 indicates high severity. EPSS information is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. An attacker who can influence a 30x redirect response can redirect the client to an attacker‑controlled host. Because the client automatically follows such redirects with all headers intact, credential leakage occurs without the need for host‑level compromise. The risk is significant for applications that use automatic redirect following and rely on bearer or API‑key authentication.